Dynamic Market Mechanisms for Wind Energy by Tavafoghi, Hamidreza & Teneketzis, Demosthenis
1Dynamic Market Mechanisms for Wind Energy
Hamidreza Tavafoghi and Demosthenis Teneketzis
Abstract—Abstract— We investigate the problem of market
mechanism design for wind energy. We consider a dynamic two-
step model with one strategic seller with wind generation and one
buyer, who trade energy through a mechanism determined by a
designer. The seller has private information about his technology
and wind condition, which he learns dynamically over time. We
consider (static) forward and real-time mechanisms that take
place at time T = 1 and T = 2, respectively. We also propose
a dynamic mechanism that provides a coupling between the
outcomes of the forward and real-time markets. We show that
the dynamic mechanism outperforms the forward and real-time
mechanisms for a general objective of the designer. Therefore,
we demonstrate the advantage of adopting dynamic market
mechanisms over static market mechanisms for wind energy. The
dynamic mechanism reveals information about wind generation
in advance, and also provides flexibility for incorporation of
new information arriving over time. We discuss how our results
generalize to environments with many strategic sellers. We also
study two variants of the dynamic mechanism that guarantee no
penalty risk for the seller, and/or monitor the wind condition.
We illustrate our results with a numerical example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wind generation is intermittent and uncertain. An energy
producer with wind energy (seller) has neither complete con-
trol over his generation nor does he have an exact prediction
of his generation in advance. The information about wind
realization arrives dynamically over time and an accurate
prediction is only available within a few (5-15) minutes of
the generation time [1]. The stochastic and dynamic nature
of wind energy makes the integration of wind generation into
grids a challenging task.
The common practice for the integration of wind energy is
to incorporate it into the existing two-settlement market archi-
tecture for conventional generators along with extra-market
treatments such as feed-in tariffs, investment tax credit, and
production tax credit. The two-settlement market architecture
consists of forward markets (e.g. day-ahead market) and real-
time markets, where the outcome of forward markets is fed to
real-time markets.
For energy markets with low share of wind energy, like the
U.S., it is possible to include wind energy in real-time markets,
and treat it as negative load [4]; we call this approach real-time
mechanism. One advantage of incorporating wind energy into
real-time markets is that the allocation for wind generation
is decided when all the information about wind generation is
available. Moreover, a seller does not face any penalty risk
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as he commits to a certain level of generation only if he can
produce it. However, in energy markets with high share of
wind energy, due to reliability concerns, inclusion of wind
energy in real-time markets as negative load is not possible.
For high shares of wind energy, the system operator needs
to have information about wind generation in advance, and
to incorporate wind energy as an active generation into its
forward planning for power flow. Thus, wind energy is in-
cluded in forward markets [10]; we call this approach forward
mechanism.
In forward markets, knowledge about wind generation in
real-time is imperfect. Nevertheless, a seller needs to commit
to certain levels of generation in advance even without know-
ing the exact amount he will be able to produce in real-time.
Therefore, the energy allocation decision in forward markets is
determined only based on the incomplete information available
at the time of forward markets, and all the new information
that arrives after forward markets are closed is not incorporated
into the energy allocation decision. In some countries, like the
U.K., a seller is exposed to penalty risk if his real-time genera-
tion is different from his commitment in forward markets. We
note that this is not an issue for a conventional generator as he
has perfect knowledge of his real-time generation in advance.
The limitations of the real-time and forward market mech-
anisms discussed above motivate our work to study alterna-
tive market mechanisms for the integration of wind energy
into grids. The U.S. department of energy encourages the
development of “rules for market evolution that enable system
flexibility rationale”, i.e. market mechanisms that give a seller
flexibility in generation, and provide opportunities for the
demand side to actively respond to changes in market over
time [2]. It is desired that such mechanisms provide truthful
(probabilistic) information about the seller’s generation in real-
time, and assign commitment to the seller in advance [22]. To
achieve the above features, we need to study market mecha-
nisms in a dynamic setting that accounts for the dynamic and
intermittent nature of wind generation as well as the strategic
behavior of the seller. The forward and real-time mechanisms
discussed above are static mechanisms in the strategic sense.
That is, for each market mechanism, the sellers and buyers
make simultaneous decisions only once, and their one-shot
decisions determine the energy allocations and payments at
that market; the outcome of the market is then assumed to be
fixed and is fed as an exogenous parameter to the next market
in time.
In this paper, we consider a simple two-step model that
captures the dynamic and intermittent nature of wind gen-
eration. We propose a dynamic mechanism that provides
a coupling between the forward and real-time mechanisms,
and, unlike the (static) real-time and forward mechanisms,
allows for flexible generation of wind energy, incorporates all
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2the information that arrives over time, and provides forward
commitment of the seller.
To demonstrate the main ideas, we first consider a strategic
setting with one buyer and one seller with wind generation.
The buyer and the seller trade energy through a mechanism
determined by a mechanism designer. The seller’s cost depends
on his private technology and the wind condition which he
learns dynamically over time. Since the seller is strategic
and profit maximizer, he must be incentivized to reveal his
private information about his cost function. We formally define
such incentive payment, and utilize it in the formulation and
solution of the mechanism design problems that we consider in
this paper. We determine such incentive payments for different
market mechanisms. We then characterize the set of feasible
outcomes under each market mechanism. We show that the
dynamic mechanism outperforms the real-time and forward
mechanisms for a general objective of the designer.
After we establish our results for a setting with one seller,
we consider a setting with many sellers. We discuss how the
problem of market design with many sellers is similar to that
with one seller, and argue that our results generalize to this
setting.
Specifically, we formulate and study three different mech-
anism design problems. Two of these problems capture the
real-time and forward mechanisms. For the third problem, we
propose a new dynamic market mechanism that dynamically
couples the outcome of the real-time and forward markets.
In the dynamic market mechanism, the seller is required to
sequentially reveal his private information to the designer as
it becomes available, and accordingly refines his commitment
for energy generation over time.
We show that the set of constraints that the designer faces
due to the seller’s strategic behavior and private information is
less restrictive under the dynamic mechanism than under the
forward and real-time mechanisms. Consequently, we show
that the proposed dynamic market mechanism outperforms the
real-time and forward mechanisms. We further consider two
variants of the dynamic mechanism; one guarantees no penalty
risk to the seller, and in the other the designer monitors the
wind speed. By analyzing the outcome of these variants of
the dynamic mechanism, we characterize the effect of penalty
risk exposure and wind monitoring on the performance of the
dynamic mechanism.
Related work: Most of the literature on market design for
wind energy assumes a static information structure and has
mainly taken the forward mechanism approach. The works of
[5, 23] study the problem of optimal bidding in a forward
market with an exogenous price and penalty rate. The works
of [14, 16] investigate the problem of mechanism design for
wind aggregation among many wind producers that jointly
participate in a forward market. The work in [18] studies
the problem of auction design for a forward market that
determines the penalty rate endogenously.
The concept of (flexible) contracts with risk in electricity
market has been proposed in [6, 17, 20, 23]. The authors
of [23] propose and investigate risky contracts for wind
aggregation where there is no private information. The work
in [17] studies the problem of efficient pricing of interruptible
energy services. The authors of [6] look at the problem of op-
timal pricing for deadline-differentiated deferrable loads. The
authors of [20] study the problem of forward risky contracts
when the seller’s private information is multi-dimensional and
the wind is monitored.
The various mechanism design problems formulated in this
paper belong to the screening literature in economics. We
formulate static and dynamic mechanism design problems. Our
approach to the static mechanism design problems is similar
to the one in [7]. Our approach to the dynamic mechanism
design problems is inspired by the ones in [8, 9, 11]. We
provide a unified approach for all the mechanism design
problems that enables us to demonstrate the advantage of
dynamic mechanisms over static mechanisms for the wind
energy market.
Contribution: We propose a dynamic model that enables
us to provide a comparison among various market mechanisms
for wind energy. We propose and analyze a dynamic market
mechanism that couples the outcomes of the real-time and
forward mechanisms. We show that the proposed dynamic
mechanism outperforms the real-time and forward mecha-
nisms for a general objective of the market designer. The
proposed dynamic mechanism reveals to the system designer
the information required for planning in advance, incorporates
the new information that arrives over time, and provides
flexibility for the intermittent wind energy generation. We
further study the effect of providing penalty insurance to the
seller and monitoring the wind condition. We show that the
performance of the dynamic mechanism with no penalty risk
is in general inferior to the dynamic mechanism with penalty
risk. Moreover, with wind monitoring, the outcome of the
dynamic mechanism improves, as the seller cannot manipulate
the outcome of the mechanism by misrepresenting his wind
condition.
Organization: We present our model in Section II. In
Section III, we discuss the market mechanism design prob-
lems as well as the seller’s strategic behavior and private
information. In Section IV, we propose the dynamic market
mechanism, and formulate three mechanism design problems
accordingly. We analyze the formulated mechanism design
problems and compare them in Section V. In Section VI,
we provide some additional remarks and consider variants of
the proposed dynamic mechanism. We illustrate our results
with an example in Section VII. We discuss how our results
generalize to settings with many sellers in Section VIII, and
conclude in Section IX. All the technical proofs can be found
in Appendices A-C [21].
II. MODEL
Consider a buyer and a diversified seller with wind energy
generation who trade energy through a mechanism determined
by a designer. We refer to the seller as “he” and the designer
and the buyer as “she”. The buyer gets utility V(qˆ) from
receiving energy qˆ; V(qˆ) is increasing and strictly concave in
qˆ. The seller has production cost C(qˆ; θ) parametrized by his
3type θ∈{θ, θ}.2 The seller’s type depends on his technology
τ (i.e. technology of his wind turbines and the operational
status of them, the size of his wind farm and its location)
and the wind speed ω. We assume that at T = 1 (e.g. day
ahead), ex-ante the seller knows privately his technology τ for
wind generation, which takes values from one of M possible
technologies T :={τ1,τ2, · · ·,τM}, τ1 < τ2 < ... < τM , with
probability p1, p2, · · · , pM ,
∑M
i=1 pi = 1, respectively. At
T=2 (e.g. real-time), the seller receives additional information
ω ∈ [ω, ω] about the wind condition and can refine his private
information about his cost function at T =2 as θ = Θ(τ, ω).
The probability distribution of wind ω is independent of the
technology τ and is denoted by G(ω). We assume that C(qˆ; θ)
is increasing in θ, and Θ(τ, ω) is decreasing in ω and τ . Define
Cθ(qˆ; θ) :=
θC(qˆ;θ)
∂θ , c(qˆ; θ) :=
∂C(qˆ;θ)
∂qˆ , cθ(qˆ; θ) :=
∂c(qˆ;θ)
∂θ , and
Θω(τ, ω):=
∂Θ(τ,ω)
∂ω .
Assumption 1. The production cost C(qˆ;θ) is increasing and
convex in qˆ. The marginal cost c(qˆ; θ) is increasing in θ, i.e.
Cθ(qˆ, θ) ≥ 0 and cθ(qˆ, θ) ≥ 0. The seller’s type Θ(τ, ω) is
decreasing in τ , i.e. Θ(τi, ω)≤Θ(τj , ω) for i > j, ∀ω, and
strictly decreasing in ω, i.e. Θω(τ, ω)<0.
Let Fi(θ) denote the resulting conditional probability dis-
tribution of θ given τi. Then, Assumption 1 states that a seller
with technology τi expects to have a lower production cost
than the one with technology τj for i > j, i.e. Fτj (θ) first
order stochastically dominates Fτi(θ).
We also make the following technical assumption.
Assumption 2. The distribution Fτ (θ) has non-shifting sup-
port, i.e. fτ is strictly positive on the interval
[
θ, θ
]
for τ ∈ T .
Assumption 2 implies that the range of achievable values of
θ is the same for all technologies τi, i=1,...,M . However, the
same realization of the wind ω results in different values of θ
for different technologies. Thus, the probability distribution of
θ, given by Fτi(θ), is different for different technologies (cf.
Assumption 1).
III. MECHANISM DESIGN AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Consider an arbitrary mechanism that determines the agree-
ment between the buyer and the seller. Let t(τ,ω) denote the
payment the buyer ends up paying to the seller with technology
τ and wind speed ω, and q(τ,ω) denote the amount of energy
the seller delivers according to the mechanism. The social
welfare S, the seller’s revenue R, and the buyer’s utility U
can be written as,
S := Eτ,ω{V(q(τ, ω))−C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))}, (1)
R := Eτ,ω{t(τ, ω)−C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))}, (2)
U := Eτ,ω{V(q(τ, ω))− t(τ, ω)}= S−R. (3)
2We assume that C(qˆ; θ) captures the seller’s operational cost, capital
cost, and an exogenous opportunity cost associated with wind generation
participation in his outside option. Moreover, we assume that the seller has
a diversified energy portfolio, so he does not face a strict capacity constraint
for generation as he can produce energy from other resources that are more
expensive. Therefore, C(qˆ; θ) is non-zero but decreasing in the realization of
wind speed.
The social welfare S only depends on q and is independent of
t. Thus, by the first order optimality condition, an allocation
qe∗ is socially efficient (maximizing S) if and only if at qe∗
the marginal utility v(qˆ):= ∂V(qˆ)∂qˆ is equal to the marginal cost
c(qˆ; θ), i.e., for all τ, ω,
v(qe∗(τ, ω)) = c(qe∗(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω)). (4)
If the seller is not strategic or does not have any private
information, the mechanism designer can set q(τ,ω) equal to
qe∗(τ,ω), to maximize the social welfare S. Then, the designer
can set payment t(τ,ω) so as to achieve any arbitrary surplus
distribution between the buyer and the seller.
However, the strategic seller does not simply reveal his
production cost function, which is his private information.
Therefore, the socially efficient allocation (4) is not sinply
implementable by the mechanism designer. The seller has
incentives to manipulate the outcome (misrepresent his cost
function, by misreporting τ and ω) in order to gain a higher
revenue. Thus, the mechanism’s output would differ from the
efficient allocation qe∗.
Due to the seller’s strategic behavior, any mechanism must
(i) incentivize the seller to truthfully reveal his private infor-
mation, and (ii) leave a non-negative revenue to the seller so
that he voluntarily participates in the mechanism.
Following the literature on regulation and market design
[13], we assume that the mechanism designer has the following
general objective,
W := U + αR, (5)
where α∈ [0, 1]. When α= 1, the designer wants to maximize
the social welfare S. When α = 0, the designer seeks to
maximize the utility of the buyer (demand side). For α∈ (0,1),
the designer’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the
buyer’s utility U and the seller’s revenue R. We assume that
the designer knows the buyer’s utility function V(qˆ).3
We invoke the revelation principle for multistage games
[15], and, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct
revelation mechanisms that are incentive compatible. In these
mechanisms, the designer determines a mechanism for the
payment and the allocation {t(τ,ω),q(τ,ω),τ∈T ,ω∈[ω,ω]} based
on the seller’s technology τ and the wind speed ω, and asks the
seller to report his private information about τ and ω over time.
The designer determines {t(τ,ω),q(τ,ω),τ∈T,ω∈[ω,ω]} so as to
ensure the truthful report of the seller; this is called incentive
compatibility (IC). A mechanism {t(τ,ω),q(τ,ω),τ∈T,ω∈[ω,ω]}
is incentive compatible if it is always optimal for the seller to
report truthfully his private information. The seller voluntarily
participates in the mechanism if he earns a positive (expected)
revenue from the agreement; this is known as individual
rationality (IR).
Define Rτ,ω := t(τ,ω)−C(q(τ,ω);Θ(τ,ω)) as the seller’s
revenue with technology τ and wind ω, and Rτ :=Eτ{Rτ,ω}
as the seller’s expected revenue with technology τ . Then,
3In practice, even when the designer’s objective is to maximize the social
welfare, we have α < 1 due to cost/loss associated with financial transaction
between the buyer and the seller (see [13] for more discussion). We note that
the case where α > 1 is of no interest, as it implies that simply the money
flow from the buyer to the seller increases the designer’s objective.
4R=Eτ{Rτ}=Eτ,ω{Rτ,ω}. In the next section, we show that
the IC and IR constraints can be written in terms of Rτ,ω,
and Rτ . We show that any mechanism design problem can be
formulated as a constrained functional optimization problem,
where we determine the optimal allocation and the seller’s
revenue that maximizeW subject to the IC and IR constraints.
IV. MARKET MECHANISMS
We consider different structures and timings of mechanisms,
and formulate the resulting mechanism design problems ac-
cordingly. We consider a forward mechanism that takes place
at T = 1. We also consider a real-time mechanism that takes
place at T = 2. Moreover, we propose a dynamic mechanism
that takes place at T = 1 and T = 2. Therefore, we formulate
three mechanism design problems for the model of Section
II: (A) real-time mechanism, (B) forward mechanism, (C)
dynamic mechanism. By comparing the solutions to these
mechanism design problems, we demonstrate the advantage
of the dynamic mechanism over the static forward and real-
time mechanisms.
We show that when the objective of the designer is to
maximize W , given by (5), each of the mechanism design
problems mentioned above can be formulated as a functional
optimization problem with different sets of constraints. In
Section V, we determine the restrictions that each of these
sets of constraints implies on the outcome of the mechanism
design problems. Thus, we demonstrate how each of the three
market structures impact the market outcome.
A. Forward Mechanism
In the forward mechanism, the designer specifies the mech-
anism that determines the agreement between the buyer and
the seller at T = 1; the information about wind speed ω that
becomes available at T = 2 is ignored. This mechanism is
similar to the current day-ahead integration in Europe, and
the proposed firm contracts in the literature.
Since information ω is not available at T = 1, the allo-
cation function q(τ,ω) and the payment function t(τ,ω) are
independent of ω. Therefore, we drop the dependence on ω and
denote the allocation and payment functions for the forward
mechanism by q(τ) and t(τ), respectively. The optimal forward
mechanism is then given by the solution to the following
optimization problem:
max
q(·),t(·)
W
subject to
IC: Rτ ≥t(τˆ)−Eω{C(q(τˆ);Θ(τ,ω))} ∀τ, τˆ , (6)
IR: Rτ ≥ 0 ∀τ. (7)
We note that (7) only ensures a positive expected revenue for
the seller with technology τ , and, therefore, exposes him to
the risk of penalty (i.e. Rτ,ω<0) for low realizations of ω.4
4For simplicity, we do not model forward mechanisms with explicit penalty
rate for shortfalls here. In Section VI, we discuss how our result continue to
hold when we consider forward market mechanisms with explicit penalty for
shortfalls.
B. Real-Time Mechanism
In the real-time mechanism, the designer specifies the
mechanism that determines the agreement between the buyer
and the seller at T = 2, after the information about wind
speed ω is available to the seller. We assume that the wind
speed ω is not monitored by the designer. This mechanism is
similar to the current real-time market integration in the U.S.
The allocation and payment functions {q(τ,ω),t(τ,ω)} depend
on (τ, ω), and the seller reports/reveals his technology τ and
his private knowledge about ω simultaneously at T = 2. The
optimal real-time mechanism is then given by the solution to
the following optimization problem:
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
W
subject to
IC:Rτ,ω≥t(τˆ,ωˆ)−C(q(τˆ,ωˆ);Θ(τ,ω)) ∀τ,ω,τˆ,ωˆ, (8)
IR: Rτ,ω ≥ 0 ∀τ, ω. (9)
Equation (8) ensures that the seller’s revenue by reporting the
true value of (τ,ω) is higher than the one with any misreport
(τˆ,ωˆ). Equation (9) guarantees a positive revenue for the seller
for all wind realizations, thus, ensuring no penalty risk for
him.
C. Dynamic Mechanism
In the dynamic mechanism, the designer specifies the mech-
anism that determines the agreement between the buyer and
the seller at T = 1. However, unlike the forward mechanism,
the dynamic mechanism determines an agreement that is
contingent on the information about the wind speed ω that
becomes available at T = 2. Moreover, unlike the real-time
mechanism, the seller reports τ and ω sequentially; at T =1,
he reports τ , then at T=2, he reports ω. We assume that the
wind speed ω is not monitored by the designer. Therefore, the
optimal dynamic mechanism is given by the solution to the
following optimization problem:
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
W
subject to
IC1:Rτ≥Eω{t(τˆ,σ(ω))−C(q(τˆ,σ(ω));Θ(τ,ω))} ∀τ,τˆ,σ(·), (10)
IC2:Rτ,ω≥t(τ, ωˆ)−C(q(τ,ωˆ);Θ(τ,ω)) ∀τ, ω, ωˆ, (11)
IR:Rτ≥0 ∀τ. (12)
The above dynamic mechanism design problem involves two
IC constraints (10) and (11). By (10), the designer ensures the
seller’s true report of τ , even when he can potentially coor-
dinate his misreport τˆ at T = 1 with an arbitrary (mis)report
strategy σ(ω) of ω at T=2. The designer ensures the seller’s
truthful report of ω at T=2 by (11), assuming that the seller
already reported the true τ at time T=1.
V. COMPARISON OF MARKET MECHANISMS
In all three mechanism design problems formulated in
Section IV, the designer wants to maximize W = U + αR =
S + (α − 1)R. However, in each problem the designer faces
a different set of constraints due to the seller’s strategic
5behavior and private information about his cost function, as
well as the specific mechanism structure and rules. In this
section, we analyze these sets of constraints so as to compare
the performance of the three mechanism design problems
presented in Section IV.
We proceed as follows. We consider the set of constraints
that the designer needs to satisfy for each market mechanism:
constraints (6,7) for the forward mechanism, constraints (8,9)
for the real-time mechanism, and constraints (10-12) for the
dynamic mechanism. We investigate the implications of each
of these sets of constraints under the corresponding market
structure. We provide a reduced form of these constraints in
Theorems 1 and 2. Using the results of Theorems 1 and 2, we
show that the set of constraints in the dynamic mechanism is
less restrictive than the set of constraints in the forward and
real-time mechanisms. Therefore, we show that the outcome
of the dynamic market mechanism outperforms those of the
forward and real-time mechanisms (Theorem 3).
We start our analysis by determining the condition thatRτ,ω
must satisfy so as to ensure the seller’s truthful report about
ω in the real-time and dynamic mechanisms.
Theorem 1. The real-time and dynamic mechanisms are
incentive compatible for ω (constraints (8) and (11), respec-
tively), if the allocation function q(τ, ω) is increasing in ω,
and the seller’s revenue Rτ,ω satisfies
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (13)
where Cθ(q; θ) :=
∂C(q;θ)
∂θ and Θω(τ, ω) :=
∂Θ(τ,ω)
∂ω . The
inequality (13) is strict if q(τ, ω) > 0.
Theorem 1 states that, under the assumption that the seller
reports truthfully his technology τ , his revenue Rτ,ω must be
increasing in ω, as in (13), so that he is incentivized to report
ω truthfully.
We next provide conditions on Rτ = Eω{Rτ,ω} so as to
ensure that the seller with technology τi reports truthfully in
the forward, real-time, and dynamic mechanisms (constraints
(6), (8), and (10) resp.). Moreover, we determine the conditions
that Rτ must satisfy so as to ensure the seller’s voluntary par-
ticipation in the forward, real-time, and dynamic mechanisms
(constraints (7), (9), and (12) resp.).
For that matter, we define,
RT(τj,τi;q):=
∫
(C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ω))−C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τi,ω)))dG(ω),
RW(τj,τi;q):=
∫∫ σ∗(τj ;τi,ω)
ω
(Cθ(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ωˆ))−Cθ(q(τj,ωˆ);Θ(τj,ωˆ)))
Θω(τj,ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω),
where σ∗(τj ;τi,ω) is uniquely defined by Θ(τj,ω) =
Θ(τi, σ
∗(τj;τi,ω))5. That is, σ∗(τj ;τi,ω) denotes the wind speed
that the seller with technology τj requires so as to have a
generation cost identical to that of the seller with technology
τi and wind speed ω. Below, we elaborate on the role of RT
and RW .
5This is true because of Assumption 2.
Consider a seller with technology τi and wind speed ω. The
seller can misreport his technology (say, by declaring τj), or
his wind speed (say, by declaring ωˆ), or both (by declaring
τj,ωˆ). In Theorem 2, below, we prove the following result.
Under the assumption that the seller reports truthfully his wind
speed ω, the payment that incentivizes him to report truthfully
τi instead of misreporting τj is given by RT(τj,τi;q). The
seller may also misreport his wind speed ω (say, by declaring
ωˆ) after misreporting his technology τi as τj . In this case,
RW(τj,τi;q) represents the additional expected payment that
incentivizes the seller not to misreport his technology τi as τj
even when he can misreport his true wind speed. Consequently,
RT(τj,τi;q)+RW(τj,τi;q) represents the incentive payment that
the designer must provide to the seller with technology τi so
as to incentivize him not to misreport his technology as τj .
We also define,
RP (τi;q):=
∫
[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))Θω(τi, ω)dω,
which results from integrating (13), followed by an expectation
with respect to ω. We show below that RP (τ1; q) determines
the minimum incentive payment that the seller with technology
τ1 (the worse technology) must receive in order to voluntarily
participate in the real-time mechanism. The precise statement
of these results is as follows.
Theorem 2. In the mechanism design problems formulated in
Section IV, the incentive compatibility and individual ratio-
nality constraints can be reduced to the following conditions.
a) For the forward mechanism,
q(τ,ω) is independent of ω, (14)
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi, τi−1; q)≥0 ∀i∈{2, ..,M}, (15)
Rτ1 = 0. (16)
b) For the real-time mechanism,
q(τ,ω) is only dependent on Θ(τ,ω) and increasing inω, (17)
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (18)
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi, τi−1; q)+RW(τi, τi−1; q)≥0
∀i∈{2,...,M}, (19)
Rτ1 = RP(τ1; q). (20)
c) For the dynamic mechanism,
q(τ,ω) is increasing in ω, (21)
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (22)
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj , τi; q)+RW(τj , τi; q)≥0,
∀i,j∈{1,...,M},i>j, (23)
Rτ1 = 0. (24)
Moreover, RT(τj,τi;q)≥0 (strict if q(τj,ω) 6=0 for some ω) and
RW(τj,τi;q)≥0 (strict if q(τ,ω) is dependent on ω).
We now comment on the results of Theorem 2. The results
of parts (a-c) reduce the set of constraints (6,7) for the forward
mechanism, constraints (8,9) for the real-time mechanism, and
6constraints (10-12) for the dynamic mechanism to those given
by (14-16), (17-20), and (21-24), respectively.
Part (a) of Theorem 2 follows from the fact that the
forward mechanism takes place at T = 1 when information
about ω in not available. Therefore, the allocation function is
independent of ω, and, thus, RW(τi,τj ;q)=0 by its definition.
Therefore, the designer only needs to provide the payment
RT(τi,τj ;q) so as to incentivize the seller to report truthfully his
technology τi instead of misreporting τj . Part (a) of Theorem
2 states further that when the seller’s technology is τi, the
payment RT(τi−1,τi;q) is enough to incentivize the seller not
to misreport τi as τi−1 or as any other technology τj .
In part (b) of Theorem 2, constraint (17) states that the
allocation function q(τ,ω) must be only a function of Θ(τ,ω),
as the seller reports both of τ and ω simultaneously at T=2.
Therefore, the designer cannot differentiate between different
pairs of (τ,ω) that correspond to the same cost function
C(q;Θ(τ,ω)). Moreover, (17) requires the allocation function
to be increasing in ω, which, along with constraint (18), en-
sures the seller’s truth telling about ω (Theorem 1). Constraint
(19) states that when the seller’s technology is τi, the payment
RT(τi−1,τi;q) +RW(τi−1,τi;q) is enough to incentivize the
seller not to misreport τi as τi−1 or as any other technology
τj . We note that, unlike the forward mechanism where the
seller with technology τ1 receives no incentive payment, in the
real-time mechanism the seller with technology τ1 receives a
positive expected incentive payment RP(τ1;q), given by (20),
that ensures truth telling about ω.
In part (c) of Theorem 2, constraints (21,22) ensure the
seller’s truth telling about ω by Theorem 1. Equation (23)
determines the incentive payment that the designer needs to
provide to the seller with technology τi, so that he does not
misreport his technology as τj , and does not misreport his
wind speed ω along with τj . We note that, unlike the real-
time market, the seller with technology τ1 does not receive a
positive expected incentive payment (see (24)).
From the designer’s point of view, the dynamic mechanism
has the following advantages over the forward and real-time
mechanisms: (i) In contrast to the forward mechanism, the
dynamic mechanism incorporates the information about the
wind speed ω that becomes available at T = 2 into the
allocation and payment functions. As a result, the set of
allocation and payment functions available to the designer
in the dynamic mechanism is richer than the ones available
in the forward mechanism. (ii) In the real-time mechanism,
the seller reports τ and ω simultaneously. Therefore, he can
perfectly coordinate his reports about τ and ω. In the dynamic
mechanism, the seller reports τ and ω sequentially over time,
thus, he cannot perfectly coordinate his reports about τ and
ω. As a result, in the dynamic mechanism, the designer can
distinguish among different pairs (τ,ω) that result in the same
cost function C(q;Θ(τ,ω)); this is not the case in the real-
time mechanism (see (17) and (21)). Furthermore, in the
dynamic mechanism the designer faces a less restrictive set
of constraints on the seller’s revenue R than the ones in the
real-time mechanism (see (20) and (24)).
Using the result of Theorem 2, we can determine the
adequate incentive payment to the seller that is associated
with an allocation function q(τ,ω) for the forward, real-time,
and dynamic mechanisms. Consequently, we can omit the
payment function t(τ,ω) and optimize over the allocation func-
tion q(τ,ω) to determine the optimal forward, real-time, and
dynamic mechanisms.6 Under a set of regularity conditions,
the resulting functional optimization problems, which are in
terms of the allocation function q(τ,ω), can be solved point-
wise separately for every pair (τ,ω) as a value optimization
problem. The closed form solutions of the optimal forward,
real-time, and dynamic mechanisms can be found in Appendix
C [21].
Using the result of Theorem 2, we can compare the sets
of constraints that the designer faces under the forward, real-
time, and forward mechanisms. We prove below that for any
arbitrary designer’s objective of the form (5), the outcome is
superior under the optimal dynamic mechanism than under the
optimal forward or optimal real-time mechanisms.
Theorem 3. The designer’s objective under the optimal dy-
namic mechanism is higher than her objectives under the op-
timal forward and the real-time mechanisms, i.e.Wdynamic >
Wforward and Wdynamic >Wreal−time.
The result of Theorem 3 demonstrates the advantage of the
dynamic mechanism over the forward and real-time mech-
anisms. We note that Theorem 3 does not provide a com-
parison between the forward and real-time mechanisms. That
is because the designer faces different sets of constraints in
the forward and the real-time mechanisms. On one hand, the
forward mechanism ignores ω in its allocation function, while
the real-time mechanism incorporates ω. On the other hand,
the incentive payments are higher in the real-time mechanism
than in the forward mechanism (see (20) and (16)) since the
seller can perfectly coordinate his simultaneous reports about
τ and ω in the real-time mechanism. The impact of these
constraints on the performance of the forward and the real-
time mechanisms depend on the specific parameters of the
model, and thus, there is no generic ordering of the designer’s
objective under the forward and real-time mechanisms.
VI. ADDITIONAL REMARKS
In this section, we examine the following variations of the
problems formulated in Section IV, and analyzed in Section V.
First, we consider a forward mechanism with explicit penalty
rate for shortfalls, and compare it with the dynamic mechanism
proposed in Section IV. Second, we consider a dynamic
mechanism that guarantees no loss for the seller for every
realization of wind speed ω. We show that the performance of
this mechanism is superior to that of the real-time mechanism
and inferior to that of the dynamic mechanism proposed in
Section IV. Third, we consider a dynamic mechanism with
6For dynamic mechanisms, the set of constraints (23) are in the form of
inequality constraints, and it is not possible to determine a priori which of
these inequality constraints are binding at the optimal solution (see [3] for
more discussion). Therefore, we need to make assumptions about which subset
of these inequality constraints are binding, and omit the payment function
using the assumed binding conditions. We then need to verify that the set
of assumed binding constraints are in fact binding at the computed optimal
dynamic mechanism.
7monitoring, where the designer monitors the wind speed ω.
We show that the dynamic mechanism with monitoring outper-
forms the dynamic mechanism proposed in Section IV, where
the designer does not monitor the wind speed ω. Moreover,
in the dynamic mechanism with monitoring, the designer can
guarantee no loss for the seller without compromising the
performance of the mechanism.
A. Forward Mechanism with Penalty Rate
The forward mechanism formulated in Section IV ignores
the wind speed ω, and determines the allocation q(τ) and
payment function t(τ) only as a function of τ . Here, we
consider a variation of the forward mechanism where the seller
is not bound to produce exactly q(τ) at T = 2. However, if
the seller’s generation at T = 2 falls short of his commitment
q(τ), he faces a penalty charge rate λ(τ) by the designer for
each unit of generation that he falls short of producing. The
penalty rate λ(τ) is agreed at T = 1 based on the seller’s
report about his technology. We refer to this variation of the
forward mechanism as forward mechanism with penalty rate.
The work of [18] studies the design of such a mechanism for
wind procurement, and the works of [5, 23] consider settings
where λ is exogenously fixed and does not depend on τ .
We note that the forward mechanism with penalty rate does
not fully ignore ω at T = 2, as it allows the seller to change
his generation at T = 2 based on the realized wind condition
ω. However, we argue below that such incorporation of ω
into the forward mechanism with penalty rate is not efficient.
Therefore, the dynamic mechanism outperforms the forward
mechanism with penalty rate.
A forward mechanism with penalty rate that is incentive
compatible and individually rational can be characterized by
allocation and payment functions {q(τ),t(τ),τ ∈ T}, along
with associated penalty rates {λ(τ),τ ∈ T}. Let e(τ,ω),
e(τ,ω)≤ q(τ), denote the amount of energy that the seller with
technology τ and wind speed ω actually produces at T = 2
(given the described forward mechanism with penalty rate).
The seller with technology τ and wind ω chooses e(τ,ω) so
as to maximize his revenue as,
e(τ, ω):=arg max
0≤eˆ≤q(τ)
{t(τ)−C(eˆ; Θ(τ, ω))− λ(τ)(q(τ)−eˆ)} .
Using e(τ,ω), we can define a dynamic mechanism
{q˜(τ,ω),t˜(τ,ω),τ∈T ,ω∈[ω,ω]} that is equivalent to the forward
mechanism with penalty rate described above. Define,
q˜(τ, ω) := e(τ, ω), (25)
t˜(τ, ω) := t(τ)− λ(τ)(q(τ)−e(τ, ω)). (26)
The dynamic mechanism {q˜(τ,ω),t˜(τ,ω),τ ∈ T ,ω ∈ [ω,ω]}
defined above is incentive compatible and individually rational
since it induces the same allocation and payment function
for the seller with technology τ and wind ω as the forward
mechanism with penalty rate.
In the equivalent dynamic mechanism {q˜(τ,ω),t˜(τ,ω),τ ∈
T ,ω∈ [ω,ω]} constructed above, the payment function t˜(τ,ω)
is linear in q˜(τ,ω) (see (26)). However, in the optimal dynamic
mechanism, the payment t(τ,ω) is in general, nonlinear in
q(τ,ω) (see the example in Section VII). Therefore, even
though the forward mechanism with penalty rate allows the
seller to modify his generation according to the realized wind
speed ω, such incorporation of ω is not as efficient as in the
dynamic mechanism.
B. Dynamic Mechanism with no Penalty
The dynamic mechanism formulated in Section IV promises
a positive expected revenue to the seller for every technology
τ (see the IR constraint (12)). However, once the seller signs
the agreement at T = 1, he is committed to following the
terms of the agreement. Similar to the forward mechanism, it is
possible that in the dynamic mechanism, the realized revenue
of the seller becomes negative for very low realizations of
wind speed, i.e. Rτ,ω < 0 for small values of ω (note that the
IR constraint (12) only guarantees Rτ =E{Rτ,ω}≥ 0).
In this section, we consider a variation of the dynamic
mechanism that guarantees no loss for the seller for every
realization of ω, i.e. Rτ,ω ≥ 0. We refer to this mechanism as
the dynamic mechanism with no penalty. The optimal dynamic
mechanism with no penalty is given by the solution to the
following optimization problem:
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
W
subject to
IC1:Rτ≥Eω{t(τˆ,σ(ω))−C(q(τˆ,σ(ω));Θ(τ,ω))} ∀τ,τˆ,σ(·), (27)
IC2:Rτ,ω≥t(τ, ωˆ)−C(q(τ,ωˆ);Θ(τ,ω)) ∀τ, ω, ωˆ, (28)
IR:Rτ,ω≥0 ∀τ, ω. (29)
The above optimization problem is similar to the optimization
problem formulated for the optimal dynamic mechanism in
Section IV. The only difference is that we replace the ex-
ante IR constraint Rτ ≥ 0, given by (12), with the ex-post IR
constraint Rτ,ω ≥ 0, given by (29).
It is clear that the IR constraint Rτ,ω ≥ 0 is more restrictive
than the ex-ante IR constraint Rτ ≥ 0. Therefore, the per-
formance of the optimal dynamic mechanism with no penalty
is inferior to that of the optimal dynamic mechanism. Never-
theless, we show below that the optimal dynamic mechanism
with no penalty outperforms the optimal real-time mechanism.
Theorem 4. (i) The set of IC and IR constraints for dynamic
mechanism with no penalty, given by (27-29), can be reduced
to the following conditions,
q(τ,ω) is increasing in ω, (30)
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (31)
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj , τi; q)+RW(τj , τi; q)≥0,
∀i,j∈{1,...,M},i>j, (32)
Rτ1 ≥ RP(τ1; q). (33)
(ii) The designer’s objective, given by (5), under the opti-
mal dynamic mechanism with no penalty is higher than her
objective under the optimal real-time mechanism and lower
8than her objective under the optimal dynamic mechanism, i.e.
Wdynamic>Wdynamic no penalty>W real-time.
Part (i) of Theorem 4 states the analogue result of part (c) of
Theorem 2 for dynamic mechanisms with no penalty. We note
that the set of constraints (31,32) for the dynamic mechanisms
with no penalty is the same as the set of constraints (22,23) for
dynamic mechanisms in part (c) of Theorem 2. This is because
the IC constraints (27,28) for dynamic mechanisms with no
penalty are the same as the IC constraints (10,11) for dynamic
mechanisms. However, constraint (33) for the dynamic mech-
anism with no penalty is different from constraint (24) for
the dynamic mechanism. In the dynamic mechanism with no
penalty we impose the ex-post IR constraint (29) instead of
the less restrictive interim IR constraint (12) imposed for the
dynamic mechanism. As a result, the designer cannot reduce
the incentive payment she pays to the seller by exposing him
to penalty risk for low realizations of wind speed ω. The ex-
post constraint requires that Rτ1,ω ≥ 0, where τ1 and ω denote
the worst technology and lowest wind speed realization for the
seller, respectively. Using constraint (31), which is implied by
the IC constraint about ω at T = 2, the expected revenue
Eω{Rτ1,ω} is strictly positive for the seller with technology
τ1, and must be greater than or equal to RP(τ1;q) (see (33)).
Part (ii) of Theorem 4 follows directly from the result of
part (i). First, the set of constraints (31-33) for the dynamic
mechanism with no penalty is more restrictive than the set
of constraints (22-24) for the dynamic mechanism (of Sec-
tion IV). Therefore, the performance of the optimal dynamic
mechanism with no penalty is inferior to that of the optimal
dynamic mechanism.
Second, comparing the set of constraints (31-33) for the
dynamic mechanism with no penalty with the set of constraints
(18-20) for the real-time mechanism (in particular (19) and
(32)), it is clear that the designer’s objective under the optimal
dynamic mechanism with no penalty is higher than her objec-
tive under the optimal real-time mechanism. This is because
under the real-time mechanism, the designer cannot distinguish
between different pairs of (τ, ω) corresponding to the same
Θ(τ,ω) (see (17)), whereas, in the dynamic mechanism with
no penalty, distinction among all pairs of (τ,ω) is possible as
the seller reports τ and ω sequentially.
We note that Theorem 4 does not provide a comparison
between the forward mechanism and the dynamic mechanisms
with no penalty. This is because, on one hand, the forward
mechanism ignores ω in its allocation function. On the other
hand, in the dynamic mechanism with no penalty we impose
the no penalty risk constraint, i.e. ex-post IR (29). The impact
of these two constraints on the performance of the forward
mechanism and the dynamic mechanism with no penalty
depends on the specific parameters of the model, and thus,
there is no generic ordering among them in terms of the
designer’s objective.
C. Dynamic Mechanism with Wind Monitoring
In the model of Section II, we use ω to denote the wind
speed information that becomes available only to the seller
at T = 2. In this section, we consider a scenario where the
designer can also monitor the realization of wind speed ω.
In the following, we formulate the dynamic mechanism
design problem under this assumption. We refer to this mech-
anism as the dynamic mechanism with monitoring. Assuming
that the designer monitors ω, the seller is only required to
reveal his private technology τ at T=1. Therefore, the optimal
dynamic mechanism with monitoring is given by the solution
to the following optimization problem:
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
W
subject to
IC:Rτ≥Eω{t(τˆ , ω)−C(q(τˆ ,ω);Θ(τ,ω))} ∀τ,τˆ, (34)
IR:Rτ≥0 ∀τ. (35)
The above optimization problem is similar to the optimization
problem for the optimal dynamic mechanism in Section IV.
However, there is no IC constraint for ω in the dynamic
mechanism with monitoring, as the designer monitors ω.
Below, we show that wind monitoring provides two advan-
tages to the designer. First, it improves the outcome of the
dynamic mechanism. Second, it enables the designer to render
the dynamic mechanism with monitoring free of any penalty
risk for the seller simply by modifying the payment function
for different realizations of ω.
Theorem 5. (i) The set of IC and IR constraints for the
dynamic mechanism with monitoring, given by (34,35) can
be reduced to the following conditions,
Rτi−Rτj =RT(τj , τi; q)≥0, ∀i,j∈{1,...,M},i>j, (36)
Rτ1 = 0. (37)
(ii) The designer’s objective under the optimal dynamic mech-
anism with monitoring is higher than her objective under
the optimal dynamic mechanism, the optimal dynamic mech-
anism with no penalty risk, and the optimal real-time and
forward mechanisms. i.e. Wdynamic with monitoring > Wdynamic >
Wdynamic no penalty > W real-time, and Wdynamic with monitoring >
Wdynamic>W forward.
(iii) In the dynamic mechanism with wind monitoring, the
designer can guarantee no penalty risk for the seller, without
changing the mechanism outcome in terms of her objectiveW ,
the buyer’s utility U , and the seller’s revenue R.
We summarize the results of Theorems 2-5 on incen-
tive payments to the seller under different market mecha-
nisms in Table I. For a given allocation function q(τ,ω),
define RT(q) := ∑Mi=2 pi∑ij=2RT(τj,τj−1;q), RW(q) :=∑M
i=2
∑i
j=2 piRT(τj,τj−1;q), and RP(q) := RP(τ1;q). Then,
RT (q) denotes the incentive payment that the designer must
pay to the seller so that he reveals truthfully his private
technology τ . If the designer wants to incorporate ω in energy
allocation and does not monitor ω, then she needs to pay the
additional incentive payment RW (q) so that the seller reveals
ω truthfully. Without monitoring ω, if the designer wants to
guarantee no penalty risk for the seller, then she must pay an
additional incentive payment RP (q) to the seller.
90 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
wind speed ω
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
q
type τ1
Efficient alloation
Dynamic with monitoring
Dynamic
Forward
Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(a) Allocation q(τ1, ω)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
wind speed ω
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
q
type τ2
Efficient alloation
Dynamic with monitoring
Dynamic
Forward
Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(b) Allocation q(τ2, ω)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
wind speed ω
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
pa
ym
en
t t
Dynamic with monitoring
Dynamic
Forward
Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(c) Payment t(τ1, ω)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
wind speed ω
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
pa
ym
en
t t
Dynamic with monitoring
Dynamic
Forward
Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(d) Payment t(τ2, ω)
Fig. 1: Example - optimal mechanisms
Wind monitoring No wind monitoring
Penalty risk RT (q) RT (q) +RW (q)
No penalty risk RT (q) RT (q) +RW (q) +RP (q)
TABLE I: Incentive payment to the seller
VII. EXAMPLE
We consider an environment where the designer’s objective
is W = U+0.5R (i.e. α= 0.5). That is, the designer assigns
more weight on the welfare of the demand than on the seller’s
revenue. The buyer has utility function V(qˆ) = qˆ− 12 qˆ2. The
seller has linear cost function C(qˆ;θ) = θqˆ. The seller has
two possible technologies; technology τ1 (inferior technology)
with marginal cost Θ(τ1,ω) = 1 − ω, and technology τ2
(superior technology) with marginal cost Θ(τ2,ω)=(1−ω)2.
We assume that the designer believes that both technologies
are equally likely and each has probability 0.5. The wind speed
ω is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Using the results of Theorems 2-5, we compute the op-
timal forward, real-time, and dynamic mechanisms as well
as the optimal dynamic mechanisms with no penalty and
with monitoring. (see Appendix C [21] for the closed form
solution of the general case). Figure 1 depicts the allocation
and payment functions for each of the optimal mechanisms.
The outcome of these different mechanisms is summarized in
Table II. Consistent with the results of Theorems 3-5, we find
that Wdynamic with monitoring > Wdynamic > Wdynamic no penalty >
W real-time, and Wdynamic with monitoring >Wdynamic > U forward. We
note that, as discussed in Section VI.B, there exists no general
ordering between the dynamic mechanism with no penalty and
the forward mechanism.
‘ As we argued earlier, the seller’s strategic behavior affects
the efficiency of a mechanism and distorts its outcome from
the efficient allocation (see Fig. 1). We note that for τ2, the
allocation functions in the dynamic mechanism and dynamic
mechanism with monitoring are the same as the efficient
allocation. Moreover, for τ1, the distortion of the allocation
function from the efficient allocation is less under the dynamic
mechanism than under the real-time and forward mechanisms.
These observations further illustrate the advantage of the dy-
namic mechanism over the forward and real-time mechanisms.
Next, we consider the seller’s revenue R. We note that
the seller’s revenue is the highest under the optimal real-time
mechanism. This is because (i) the seller is not subject to any
penalty risk under the real-time mechanism (as opposed to
the forward and dynamic mechanisms); (ii) the seller reports
τ and ω simultaneously, therefore, he has more power in
manipulating his reports (about τ and ω) to the designer
than in the dynamic mechanism, where he reports τ and
ω sequentially. We also note that the seller’s revenue under
the optimal dynamic mechanism is higher than that of the
forward mechanism because the forward mechanism ignores
wind speed ω whereas wind speed ω is incorporated in
the dynamic mechanism, and, therefore, the seller receives
additional incentive (payment) to report ω truthfully. Next,
we note that the seller’s revenue under the optimal dynamic
mechanism is lower than of the optimal dynamic mechanism
with no penalty, and higher than of the optimal dynamic
mechanism with monitoring. This is because the payment to
the seller is lower in the optimal dynamic mechanism with
monitoring and higher in the optimal dynamic mechanism with
no penalty (see Table I).
As pointed out above, the dynamic and forward mechanisms
expose the seller to penalty risk (negative revenue) for low
realizations of the wind speed ω. However, in the dynamic
mechanism with monitoring, the dynamic mechanism with
no penalty, and the real-time mechanism, the seller always
receives a non-negative revenue for all realizations of ω. Figure
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Mechanisms Buyer’s UtilityU
Seller’s Revenue
R
Designer’s Objective
W
Efficient allocation — — 0.2167
Forward 0.1372 0.0347 0.1545
Real-time 0.0693 0.1210 0.1298
Dynamic 0.1729 0.0417 0.1938
Dynamic with no penalty 0.1077 0.0842 0.1498
Dynamic with monitoring 0.1813 0.0333 0.1979
TABLE II: Example - the buyer’s utility U , the information rent R, and the
designer’s objective W
2 shows the seller’s revenue for all the mechanisms and all
realizations of ω.
Next, we consider the buyer’s utility U . The buyer’s utility
under te dynamic mechanism is higher than that of the forward
and real-time mechanisms. This is because the dynamic mech-
anism’s efficiency is higher than that of the optimal forward
and real-time mechanisms, and this is also reflected in the
buyer’s utility. Moreover, for a given allocation function, the
incentive payment made by the buyer to the seller under the
optimal dynamic mechanism is less than the incentive pay-
ments under the optimal forward and real-time mechanisms.
The buyer’s utility under the optimal dynamic mechanism
is higher than that of the optimal dynamic mechanism with
no penalty, and lower than that of the optimal dynamic
mechanism with monitoring. This is because the payment
made by the buyer to the seller is lower in the optimal dynamic
mechanism with monitoring and higher in the optimal dynamic
mechanism with no penalty (see Table I).
We note that in the forward and real-time mechanisms,
which are static mechanisms, the payment the seller receives
for producing a certain amount of energy qˆ is independent of
his type. However, this is not the case in the dynamic mech-
anism (see Fig. 3). In the dynamic mechanism the payment
and allocation depend on the seller’s reports at T = 1 and
T = 2. Therefore, depending on the seller’s reports at T = 1
and T = 2, the designer can provide different payments to the
seller for producing the same amount of energy. In Fig. 3, one
can see that the seller with the superior technology τ2 receives
a higher payment than the seller with the inferior technology
τ1 for high quantities of energy produced. On the contrary,
for low quantities of energy produced the seller with inferior
technology τ1 receives a higher payment than the seller with
superior technology τ2. The difference in payments to different
types of seller for the same quantity of energy produced,
allows the designer to differentiate among different types of
seller, thus, to increase the efficiency of the mechanism.
VIII. EXTENSION TO MANY SELLERS
To demonstrate the main ideas, namely the advantage
of the dynamic mechanism over the forward and real-time
mechanisms, we considered a setting with only one seller
in the model of Section II. However, in a general electricity
market there exist many sellers competing with one another.
In this section, we discuss how our results on the advantage
of the dynamic mechanism over the forward and real-time
mechanisms also hold for environments with many sellers.
Due to space limitation, we do not provide detailed proofs; we
only provide the sketch of the proof following steps similar to
those presented for the model with one seller.
Consider a model similar to that of Section II, with
N sellers. Seller n, n ∈ {1,...,N}, has generation cost
C(qˆn; Θ(τn, ωn)), where qˆn denotes the amount of energy
he produces, and τn and ωn denotes seller n’s technology
and wind speed, respectively. We assume that τn takes values
in {τn1 , ..., τnM} with probability (pn1 ..., pnM ). The probability
distribution of ωn ∈ [ω, ω] is independent of τn. The wind
speeds ω1, ..., ωN may be correlated as the sellers can be
located in geographically close locations. We assume that joint
distribution of (ω1,...,ωN) (resp. (τ1,...,τN)), is commonly
known to all sellers as well as the designer. Furthermore,
Assumptions 1 and 2 of Section II, hold for every seller n,
n∈{1,...,N}.
Similar to the approach presented in Section III, we in-
voke the revelation principle and restrict attention to direct
revelation mechanisms that are incentive compatible and in-
dividually rational. Let τ−n (resp. ω−n) denote the set of
all sellers’ technologies (resp. wind speeds) except seller n’s
technology τn (resp. wind speed ωn). In the model with many
sellers, seller n’s allocation and payment are functions of
seller n’s reports about τn and ωn as well as all the other
sellers’ reports about τ−n and ω−n. Let qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n),
and tn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n) denote the allocation and payment
functions for seller n, respectively.
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We assume that the designer does not reveal the reports of
seller n to other sellers before finalizing the payments and
allocations of all sellers. Define,
C¯n(τˆn,ωˆn;τn,ωn):=Eτ−n,ω−n
{
C(qn(τˆn,ωˆn,τ−n,ω−n);Θ(τn,ωn))∣∣τn,ωn}, (38)
t¯n(τˆn, ωˆn):=Eτ−n,ω−n{tn(τˆn,ωˆn,τ−n,ω−n)
∣∣τn,ωn}, (39)
as seller n’s conditional expected cost and payment, respec-
tively, when he has technology τn and wind ωn, and he reports
τˆn and ωˆn. We note that, the expectations above are written
using the fact that at equilibrium, seller i believes that other
sellers report their private information truthfully.
Similar to Section III, let
Rnτn,ωn:=Eτ−n,ω−n
{
tn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n)
−C(qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n);Θ(τn,ωn))},
denote the expected revenue of seller n with technology τn
and wind ωn. Also, define,
Rnτn:=Eωn{Rnτn,ωn},
Rn := Eτn{RnτnRnτn}.
Moreover, let,
Umany:=E{τn,ωn}Nn=1
{
V
(
N∑
n=1
qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n)
)
−
N∑
n=1
tn(τn,ωn,τ−n, ω−n)
}
,
Wmany :=Umany+α
N∑
n=1
Rn,
denote the buyer’s expected utility and the designer’s objective,
respectively.
We discuss how the results of Theorems 1-3 (on the
advantage of the dynamic mechanism over the forward and
real-time mechanisms) continue to hold in the model with
many sellers described above.
The key idea is the following. We write each mechanism
design problem with many sellers in a form similar to the
corresponding mechanism design problem with one seller
(formulated in Section IV). We write these mechanism design
problems using the conditional expected cost and payment
functions, defined by (38) and (39), respectively, instead of the
cost and payment functions that appear in the problems with a
single seller. We show that in each mechanism design problem
and for each seller, the designer faces a set of constraints that
are similar to those that arise in the case with a single seller.
Therefore, the arguments used in the proofs of Theorems 1-3
can be directly extended to environments with many sellers.
We proceed with the formulation of the mechanism design
problems with many sellers, and discuss how the results of
Theorems 1-3 continue to hold in the model with many sellers.
Forward mechanism: In the forward mechanism, the al-
location function qn(τˆn,ωˆn,τ−n,ωˆ−n) and payment function
tn(τˆn,ωˆn,τ−n,ωˆ−n) for seller n are independent of the reported
wind speeds ωˆn and ωˆ−n. Therefore, we drop the dependence
on (ωˆn, ωˆ−n), and denote the conditional expected cost and
payment functions by C¯n(τˆn; τn, ωn) and t¯n(τˆn), respec-
tively. The optimal forward mechanism with many sellers is
given by the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
{qn(.),tn(.)}Nn=1
Wmany
subject to
ICn: Rnτn≥ t¯n(τˆn)−Eω{C¯n(τˆ ;τ,ωn)} ∀τn, τˆn, n (40)
IRn: Rnτn ≥ 0 ∀τn, n. (41)
We note that in the above optimization problem, the designer
faces a set of constraints, given by (40,41), for every seller
n. These constraints are similar to those given by (6,7) for
the forward mechanism with a single seller. Therefore, we can
show that seller’s expected revenueRnτn for every seller i must
satisfy a set of constraints similar to those given by (15,16)
in part (a) of Theorem 2 in terms of conditional expected cost
C¯n(τˆn;τn,ωn).
Real-time mechanism: The real-time mechanism design
problem with many sellers can be formulated as follows.
max
{qn(.),tn(.)}Nn=1
Wmany
subject to
ICn:Rnτn,ωn≥t¯n(τˆn,ωˆn)−C¯n(ˆτn,ωˆn;τn,ωn)
∀τn,ωn,τˆn,ωˆn, n, (42)
IRn: Rnτn,ωn ≥ 0 ∀τn, ωn, n. (43)
Note that the set of constraints (42,43), for every seller
n, is similar to the set of constraints (8,9) in the real-time
mechanism with a single seller. Therefore, we can show that
expected revenue Rnτn,ωn must satisfy a set of constraints
similar to those given by Theorem 1. Consequently, we can
show that the set of constraints that the designer faces for
every seller n can be reduced to a set of constraints that are
similar to those given by (18-20) in part (b) of Theorem 2 in
terms of expected seller’s revenue Rnτn,ωn and Rnτn , and the
conditional expected cost C¯n(τˆn,ωˆn;τn,ωn). We can also show
that q(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n) must only be a function of Θn(τn,ωn)
and Θm(τm,ωm), m 6=n, since all sellers report simultaneously
about their own technologies and wind speeds (see (17)).
Using an argument similar to the one in Theorem 2 for seller
n, we can also show that Eτ−n,ω−n{qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n)} must
be increasing in ωn.
Dynamic mechanism: The optimal dynamic mechanism
with many sellers is given by the solution to the following
optimization problem:
max
{qn(.),tn(.)}Nn=1
Wmany
subject to
ICn1 :Rnτn≥Eωn{t¯n(τˆn,σn(ωn))−C¯n(τˆn,σn(ωn);τn,ωn)}
∀τn,τˆn,σn(·),n, (44)
ICn2 :Rnτn,ωn≥ t¯n(τn,ωˆn)−C¯n(τn,ωˆn;τn,ωn) ∀τn,ωn,ωˆn,n,(45)
IRn :Rnτn≥0 ∀τ, n. (46)
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As we mentioned above, we assume that the designer does not
reveal other sellers’ report about τ−n at T = 1. Therefore,
seller n’s IC constraint about ω at T = 2 is given by (45),
where seller n assumes that other sellers report truthfully τ−n
and ω−n. We note that the set of constraints (44-46), for every
seller n, is similar to the set of constraints (10-12) in the dy-
namic mechanism with a single seller. Therefore, we can show
that the expected seller’s revenue Rnτn,ωn must satisfy a set of
constraints similar to those given by Theorem 1. Furthermore,
we can show that the expected seller’s revenue Rnτn,ωn and
Rnτn for every seller n must satisfy a set of constraints that
are similar to the ones given by ((22-24) in part (c) of Theorem
2. Using an argument similar to Theorem 2 for seller n, we
can also show that Eτ−n,ω−n{qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n)} must be
increasing in ωn as in (21) in part (c) of Theorem 2.
The above arguments show that all the mechanism design
problems with many sellers considered in this section, have
sets of constraints for each seller that are similar to those
that arise in the corresponding problems with a single seller.
Thus, we can show, by arguments similar to those given in the
proof of Theorem 3, that the set of constraints for the dynamic
mechanism with many sellers is less restrictive than the set
of constraints for the forward and real-time mechanisms with
many sellers. Therefore, we can establish that the dynamic
mechanism with many sellers outperforms the forward and
real-time mechanism with many sellers.
Remark 1. The optimal forward and real-time mechanism
with many sellers are standard static multi-unit auctions (see
[12]). However, the optimal dynamic mechanism with many
sellers is a form of handicap auction, first introduced in [9].
In a standard auction, seller n bids his generation cost
function simultaneously and the auctioneer determines the
outcomes based on all sellers’ bids.
In a handicap auction, at T = 1, seller n bids his current
information about his generation cost (i.e. τn), so as to pick
a menu of payment-quantity curve, from which he can select
his generation at T = 2. Then, at T=2, seller n observes the
realized wind speed ωn, and competes with other sellers for
generation based on the payment-quantity curve he won at T=
1. Sellers with better technologies anticipate to have higher
generations in real-time. Therefore, in a handicap auction, at
T = 1, they bid for payment-quantity curves that give them
high marginal prices for high generation quantities (which
are more likely for them), but low marginal prices for low
generation quantities (which are less likely for them). On the
other hand, sellers with worse technologies bid for payment-
quantity curves that give them high marginal prices for low
generation quantities (which are more likely for them), but low
marginal prices for high generation quantities (which are less
likely for them); see Fig. 3 in the example of Section VII.
IX. CONCLUSION
We investigated mechanism design problems for wind en-
ergy. We proposed a dynamic market mechanism that couples
the outcomes of the real-time and forward mechanisms. We
showed that the proposed dynamic mechanism outperforms the
forward and real-time mechanisms with respect to the integra-
tion of wind energy into the grid. In the dynamic mechanism,
the seller must sequentially reveal his private information to
the designer, and refine his commitment accordingly.
We also investigated the effects of wind monitoring and
penalty risk exposure on the market outcome.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
The proofs of Theorems 1-5 are based on Lemmas 1-7 that we
state below. The proofs of Lemmas 1-7 are given in Appendix B.
Let g(ω) denote the corresponding probability density function for
ω, i.e. g(ω) := ∂G(ω)
∂ω
.
First, we prove the following sufficient and necessary condition for
the IC2 constraint (reporting the true ω) for the dynamic mechanism.
Lemma 1 (revenue equivalence). If the dynamic mechanism is
incentive compatible, and the allocation rule q(τ, ω) is continuous
in ω, then, for all ω and ω´,
Rτ,ω = Rτ,ω´ −
∫ ω
ω´
Cθ(q(τ, ωˆ); Θ(τ, ωˆ))Θω(τ, ωˆ)dωˆ, (47)
and q(τ, ω) is increasing in ω. Moreover, if (47) holds and q(τ, ω)
is increasing in ω, then IC2 is satisfied.
We can now provide the proof for Theorem 1 using the result of
Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We note that the IC constraint (8) for the real-time mechanisms
implies the IC2 constraint for the dynamic mechanism (given by
(11), by setting τˆ = τ . By Lemma 1, the IC2 constraint for the
dynamic mechanism is satisfied only if equation (13) holds.
Lemma 1 characterizes the seller’s revenue in the dynamic mech-
anism given that he tells the truth at T =1 about his technology τ .
To complete the characterization of the seller’s optimal strategy at
T=2, we show, via Lemma 2 below, that if the seller misreports his
technology at T=1 (off-equilibrium path), he later corrects his lie at
T=2.
Lemma 2. Consider the dynamic mechanism that satisfies the IC
constraints for ω and τ . If a seller with technology τ misreports τˆ ,
τˆ 6= τ , at T = 1, then, for every wind realization ω at T = 2, he
corrects his lie by reporting ωˆ = σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω) such that,
Θ(τ, ω) = Θ(τˆ , ωˆ). (48)
Remark: Note that by Assumption 2 on non-shifting support, for
any τ, τˆ , ω, there exists a unique ωˆ (given the strict monotonicity of
Θ(τ, ω) in ω) that satisfies equation (48), and σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω) is well-
defined.
Using the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, we characterize below the
seller’s expected gain by misreporting his technology at T=1 in the
dynamic mechanism.
Lemma 3. For the dynamic mechanism that satisfies the set of
IC constraints for ω and τ , the maximum utility of the seller with
technology τ reporting τˆ at T = 1 is given by,
Eω{t(τˆ , σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω))− C(q(τˆ , σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω)); Θ(τ, ω))}
= Rτˆ−
∫∫ σ∗(τˆ ;τ,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τˆ , ωˆ); Θ(τˆ , ωˆ))Θω(τˆ , ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω) (49)
The following result, for the dynamic mechanism, characterizes the
payments that incentivize the seller to report truthfully his technology
τ and wind speed ω.
Lemma 4. For the dynamic mechanism, the set of IC constraints
for τ , given by (10), can be replaced by the following inequality
constraints,
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj , τi; q)+RW(τj , τi; q) ∀i, j∈{2, ..,M}, i>j.
To provide the proof for Theorems 2-3, we need the following
results for the forward and the real-time mechanisms.
Lemma 5. For the forward mechanism, the set of IC constraints and
IR constraints, given by (6) and (7), respectively, can be replaced by
the following constraints,
q(τ) only depends on τ
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi−1, τi; q) ∀i∈{2, ..,M},
Rτ1≥0.
Lemma 6. For the real-time mechanism, the set of IC and IR
constraints given by (8) and (9), respectively, can be replaced by
the following constraints,
q(τ, ω) only depends on Θ(τ, ω)
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi−1, τi; q)+RW(τi−1, τi; q) ∀i∈{2, ..,M − 1},
Rτ1≥RP (τ1; q),
and the seller’s revenue satisfies (13).
Using the result of Lemmas 4-6, we first provide the proof for
Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2:
We first show that RT(τj,τi;q)≥ 0 and RW(τj,τi;q)≥ 0 for i, j ∈
{1, ...,M}, i > j (strict if q(τj,ω) 6=0 for some ω).
First, note that by Assumption 1 we have Θ(τi, ω) < Θ(τj , ω)
for i > j. Thus, C(q(τj , ω); Θ(τj , ω))≥C(q(τj , ω); Θ(τi, ω)) with
strict inequality if q(τj , ω) > 0. Therefore,
RT(τj,τi;q):=
∫
(C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ω))−C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τi,ω)))dG(ω)≥0,
with strict inequality if q(τj , ω) > 0 for a set of ω’s with positive
probability.
Second, we have Cθ(q(τj , ω); Θ(τj , ωˆ))≤Cθ(q(τj , ωˆ); Θ(τj , ωˆ))
for ω ≤ ωˆ since q(τ ; ωˆ) is increasing in ωˆ by Lemma 1 and C(q, θ)
is increasing in q by Assumption 1. Moreover, by the result of Lemma
2, we have σ∗(τj ; τi, ω) ≥ ω for i > j. Therefore, we have
RW(τj,τi;q):=
∫∫ σ∗(τj ;τi,ω)
ω
(Cθ(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ωˆ))−Cθ(q(τj,ωˆ);Θ(τj,ωˆ)))
Θω(τj,ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)≥0,
since Θω(τj,ωˆ)<0; the inequality is strict if q(τj , ω) > 0 for a set
of ω’s with positive probability.
In the following, we provide the proof for each part of Theorem
2 separately.
a) The proof for part (a) directly follows from the result of Lemma
5.
b) The proof for part (b) directly follows from the result of Lemma
6.
c) By the result of Theorem 1, the set of IC constraints (11) can
be replaced by (21,22). Moreover, by the result of Lemma 4, we
can reduce the set of IC constraints (10) to the set of inequality
constraints (23).
Furthermore, set of inequality constraints (23) implies that
Rτ1 ≤ Rτ2 ≤ ... ≤ RτM since RT (τi−1, τi; q) ≥ 0 and
RW (τi−1, τi; q) ≥ 0. Thus, the set of IR constraints (12) can
be reduced to Rτ1≥0.
Next, we provide the proof for Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: The proof directly follows from the
result of Theorem 2. We note that the objective functions in all the
mechanism design problems are W , and the problems differ only in
the set of constraints they have to satisfy.
• The set of constraints for the real-time mechanism, given by part
(b) of Theorem 2, is more restrictive than the set of constraints
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for the dynamic mechanism given by part (c) of Theorem 2.
Therefore, the designer’s objective Wdyanmic is higher than his
objective W real-time.
• The set of constraints for the forward mechanism, given by part
(a) of Theorem 2, is more restrictive than the set of constraints
for the dynamic mechanisms, given by part (c) of Theorem 2.
Therefore, the designer’s objective Wdyanmic is higher than his
objective W forward.
We now provide the proof of Theorem 4 on the dynamic mecha-
nism with no penalty.
Proof of Theorem 4:
(i) We note that the set of IC constraints (27,28) for the dynamic
mechanism with no penalty is identical to the set of IC constraints
(27,28) for dynamic mechanism. Therefore, constraints (30-32) di-
rectly follow from the result of part (c) of Theorem 2.
Next, we show that the set of IR constraints (29) is satisfied if
and only if Rτi,ω ≥ RP (τi; q) and the seller’s revenue satisfies
(13). First, by part (i) of Theorem 1, we have Rτ,ω is increasing in
ω. Hence, the set of IR constraints (29) is satisfied if and only if
Rτi,ω ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1, ...,M}. Second, using (13) along withRτi,ω ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, ...,M}, we have,
Rτi ≥
∫ ω
ω
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τi, ωˆ); Θ(τ, ωˆ))Θω(τi, ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)
=
∫ ω
ω
∫ ω
ωˆ
Cθ(q(τi, ωˆ); Θ(τi, ωˆ))Θω(τi, ωˆ)dG(ω)dωˆ
=
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ωˆ)]Cθ(q(τi, ωˆ); Θ(τi, ωˆ))Θω(τi, ωˆ)dωˆ
= RP (τi; q).
Thus, the set of IR constraints (29) is satisfied if and only if (33) is
satisfied.
(ii) We note that the objective functions in all the mechanism
design problems are W , and the problems differ only in the set of
constraints they have to satisfy. The set of constraints for the real-
time mechanism, given by part (b) of Theorem 2, is more restrictive
than the set of constraints for the dynamic mechanisms with no
penalty, given by part (i) above. Therefore, the designer’s objective
Wdyanmic no penalty is higher than his objective W real-time. Moreover,
the set of constraints for the dynamic mechanism, given by part
(c) of Theorem 2, is less restrictive than the set of constraints for
the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty, given by part (i) above.
Therefore, the designer’s objective Wdyanmic no penalty is lower than his
objective Wdynamic.
To provide the proof for Theorem 5, we need the following result
for the dynamic mechanism with monitoring.
Lemma 7. For the dynamic mechanism with monitoring, the set of
IC and IR constraints, given by (34) and (35), respectively, can be
replaced by the following constraints,
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi−1, τi; q) ∀i∈{2, ..,M − 1},
Rτ1 ≥ 0.
Using the result of Lemma 7, we provide the proof of Theorem 5
below.
Proof of Theorem 5:
(i) The proof for part (i) directly follows from the result of Lemma
7.
(ii) The objective functions in all the mechanism design problems
areW , and the problems differ only in the set of constraints they have
to satisfy. The set of constraints for the dynamic mechanism, given by
part (c) of Theorem 2, is more restrictive than the set of constraints
for the dynamic mechanisms with monitoring, given by part (i) above.
Therefore, the designer’s objectiveWdyanmic with monitoring is higher than
Wdynamic. Moreover, by the result of Theorems 3 and 4, we have
Wdynamic ≥ Wdynamic no penalty ≥ W real-time and Wdynamic ≥ W forward.
(iii) Define the following modified payment function:
tˆ(τ,ω):=Eω{t(τ,ω)}+(C(q(τ,ω);Θ(τ,ω))−Eω{C(q(τ,ω);Θ(τ,ω))}) .
We have Eω{tˆ(τ, ω)} = Eω{t(τ, ω)}. Thus, the seller’s strategic
report for τ at T=1 does not change. Consider a modified mechanism
with the modified payment function tˆ(τ, ω) and the original allocation
function q(τ, ω). This modified mechanism satisfies the set of IC
constraint for τ and it satisfies the ex-post IR constraint, i.e.,
Rτ,ω = Eω{t(τ, ω)} − Eω {C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))} = Rτ ≥ 0.
We note that with the monitoring of ω, the modified mechanism
keeps the same allocation function, and therefore, results in the same
designer’s objective W , seller’s revenue R, and buyer’s utility U .
APPENDIX B - PROOF OF LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that the IC for ω and ω˘ is satisfied.
Then,
t(τ, ω)− C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω)) ≥ t(τ, ω˘)− C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω)),
t(τ, ω˘)− C(q(τ, ω˘; Θ(τ, ω˘)) ≥ t(τ, ω)− C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω˘)).
Therefore,
C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω˘))−C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω))≤Rτ,ω−Rτ,ω˘
≤C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω˘))−C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω)). (50)
Set ω˘ = ω −  where  → 0. We have ∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
=
Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω).
Moreover, (50) implies that q(τ, ω˘)<q(τ, ω) for ω˘<ω, since by
assumption Θ(τ, ω) is decreasing in ω and C(qˆ; θ) is convex and
increasing in qˆ.
To prove the converse, assume that (47) holds and q(τ, ω) is
increasing in ω. Then, for any τ, ω, ω˘, we have
Rτ,ω−[t(τ, ω˘)− C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω))]= (51)
[Rτ,ω −Rτ,ω˘]−[C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω˘))−C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω))]
=
∫ ω˘
ω
Cθ(q(τ, ωˆ); Θ(τ, ωˆ))Θω(τ, ωˆ)dωˆ
−[C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω˘))−C(q(τ, ω˘); Θ(τ, ω))] ≥ 0,
where the last last inequality is true since Cθ(q; θ) is increasing in
θ, Θ(τ, ω) is decreasing in ω, and q(τ, ω) is increasing in ω.
Proof of Lemma 2: We first note that by Assumption 2 and
the monotonicity of Θ(τˆ , ωˆ) in ω, there exists a unique ωˆ such that
Θ(τ, ω) = Θ(τˆ , ωˆ), i.e. σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω) is well-defined.
Now, consider a seller with technology τˆ and wind realization ωˆ.
Then, the IC2 constraint requires
t(τˆ , ωˆ)−C(q(τˆ , ωˆ);Θ(τˆ , ωˆ))≥t(τˆ , ω′)−C(q(τˆ , ω′);Θ(τˆ , ωˆ))∀ω′.
Replacing Θ(τˆ , ωˆ) by Θ(τ, ω) in the above equation, we get
t(τˆ , ωˆ)−C(q(τˆ , ωˆ);Θ(τ, ω))≥t(τˆ , ω′)−C(q(τˆ , ω′);Θ(τ, ω))∀ω′.
Now, consider a seller with technology τ that misreported τˆ at T=1,
and has a wind realization ω at T =2. The above inequality asserts
that it is optimal for him to report ωˆ at T = 2 so that Θ(τ, ω) =
Θ(τˆ , ωˆ).
Proof of Lemma 3: We have,
Eω{t(τˆ , σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω))− C(τˆ , σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))}
=
∫
[t(τˆ,σ∗(τˆ;τ,ω))−C(q(τˆ,σ∗(τˆ;τ,ω));Θ(τ,ω))] dG(ω). (52)
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Using Lemma 2, we get∫
[t(τˆ , σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω))− C(q(τˆ , σ∗(τˆ ; τ, ω)); Θ(τ, ω))] dG(ω)
=
∫
[t(τˆ,σ∗(τˆ;τ,ω))−C(q(τˆ,σ∗(τˆ;τ,ω));Θ(τˆ,σ∗(τˆ;τ,ω)))]dG(ω)
=
∫
Rτˆ ,σ∗(τˆ ;τ,ω)dG(ω). (53)
Then, by Lemma 1,∫
Rτˆ ,σ∗(τˆ ;τ,ω)dG(ω)=∫ [
Rτˆ ,ω−
∫ σ∗(τˆ ;τ,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τˆ , ωˆ); Θ(τˆ , ωˆ))Θω(τˆ , ωˆ)dωˆ
]
dG(ω). (54)
Furthermore, Rτˆ =
∫ Rτˆ ,ωdG(ω); thus, the RHS of (54) can be
rewritten as,
Rτˆ−
∫∫ σ∗(τˆ ;τ,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τˆ , ωˆ); Θ(τˆ , ωˆ))Θω(τˆ , ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω). (55)
The assertion of Lemma 3 follows from (52)-(55).
Proof of Lemma 4: We first prove that the set of IC constraints
for τ given by (10) can be reduced to Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj , τi; q)+RW
for all i, j∈{2, ..,M}. Next, we show that the set of IC constraints for
τ can be further reduced to Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj , τi; q)+RW(τj , τi; q)
for only i>j, i, j∈{2, ..,M}.
Using Lemma 3, we can rewrite the set of IC1 constraints , given
by (10), as follows,
Rτi−Rτj≥−
∫∫ σ∗(τj ;τi,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τj,ωˆ); Θ(τj,ωˆ))Θω(τj,ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω). (56)
Below, we prove that the RHS of (56) is equal to RT(τj,τi;q)+
RW(τj,τi;q). We have,
RT(τj,τi;q)=
∫
[C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ω))−C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τi,ω))]dG(ω)
=
∫∫ Θ(τj ,ω)
Θ(τi,ω)
Cθ(q(τj , ω); θˆ)dθˆdG(ω)
=
∫∫ ω
σ∗(τj ;τi,ω)
Cθ(q(τj , ω); Θ(τj , ωˆ))Θω(τj , ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)
=−
∫∫ σ∗(τj ;τi,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τj , ω); Θ(τj , ωˆ))Θω(τj , ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω),(57)
where the third equality results from a change of variable from θˆ to
ωˆ as θˆ := Θ(ωˆ, τj). Note that Θ(τi, ω) = Θ(τj , σ∗(τj ; τi, ω)) by
Lemma 2, thus, the new boundaries of integration with respect to ωˆ
in (57) are given by σ∗(τj ; τi, ω) and ω .
Adding RT(τj , τi; q), given by (57), to RW (τj , τi; q), we obtain,
RT (τj , τi; q)+RW (τj , τi; q)=
−
∫∫ σ∗(τj ;τi,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τj , ωˆ); Θ(τj , ωˆ))Θω(τj , ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω), (58)
which is equal to RHS of (56).
Now we show that the set of IC constraints for τ can be further
reduced to Rτi−Rτj ≥RT(τj , τi; q)+RW(τj , τi; q) for only i>j,
i, j∈{1, ..,M}.
Using (58), we can write the set of inequality constraints (56) as,
RT (τj , τi; q)+RW (τj , τi; q)
≤Rτi−Rτj≤
−RT (τi, τj ; q)−RW (τi, τj ; q) ∀i, j∈{1, ...,M}, i>j, (59)
where the lower bound is from IC1 constraint that ensures τi does not
report τj , and the upper bound is from the IC1 constraint that ensures
τj does not report τi. We note that allocation q(τ, ω) is implementable
if and only if the set of constraints described by (59) has a feasible
solution for Rτi , i∈{1, 2, ..,M}. Given an allocation rule q(τ, ω),
the set of constraints given by (59), has a feasible solutions only if
for any arbitrary increasing sequence (k1,k2),(k2,k3),· · ·,(km−1,km),
where τkr−1<τkr for 2≤r≤m,
RT(τk1,τk2 ;q)+RW(τk1,τk2 ;q)
+RT(τk2,τk3 ;q)+RW(τk2,τk3 ;q)
...
+RT(τkm−1,τkm ;q)+RW(τkm−1,τkm ;q)
≤
m∑
r=2
[
Rτkr−Rτkr−1
]
= Rτkm−Rτk1
≤ −RT(τkm,τk1 ;q)−RW(τkm,τk1 ;q). (60)
In the following, we show that for a given implementable alloca-
tion q(τ, ω), the set of constraint (59) can be reduced to
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj ,τi;q)+RW(τj ,τi;q) ∀i,j∈{1,...,M}, i>j.(61)
We note that W = S − (1− α)R, for α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for
a given allocation function q(τ, ω), the designer wants to minimize
R. Let R∗τ denote the optimal seller’s revenue that satisfies (61) for
a given implementable allocation function q(τ, ω). Construct a graph
with M nodes, where there is an edge between between node i and
j if (61) is binding for i and j, i > j.
First, we note that the resulting graph must be connected. If not,
then there exist at least two unconnected clusters of nodes. Consider
a cluster that does not include node 1. Then one can reduce the value
of R∗τ by  > 0 for all the nodes in that cluster without violating any
of the constraints (61), and improve the outcome of the mechanism
by reducing the seller’s revenue R.
Now, assume that the optimal seller’s revenue R∗τ that is deter-
mined by only considering the set of constraints (61), does not satisfy
the set of constraints (59). Then, there exists i > j so that the
following constraint that is violated,
R∗τi −R∗τj  −RT (τi, τj ; q)−RW (τi, τj ; q).
Let C = {(i, k1), (k1, k2), · · · , (km, j)} denote a path between node
i and node j in the connected graph constructed above. Then,
R∗τi −R∗τj =
∑
(kˆ,k)∈C
RT (τkˆ, τk; q) +RW (τkˆ, τk; q)
 −RT (τi, τj ; q)−RW (τi, τj ; q), (62)
which contradicts (60).
Proof of Lemma 5:
We can rewrite the set of IC constraints (6) as follows,
Rτi≥t(τj)−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τi,ω))}
=Rτj+
[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τi,ω))}
]
,
=Rτj+RT (τj,τi; q) ∀i, j ∈ {1, ...,M},
where the last equality holds by definition. We proceed as follows.
We first consider a relaxed version of the forward mechanism design
problem. We determine the solution to the relaxed problem, and show
it is also a feasible solution for the original forward mechanism design
problem.
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Consider the following relaxed version of the forward mechanism
design problem,
maxW
subject to
Rτi≥t(τi−1)−Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi,ω))}
=Rτi−1+
[
Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi−1,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi,ω))}
]
,
i∈{2, ...,M}, (63)
Rτi ≥ 0, i∈{1, ...,M}, (64)
where we only include the set of IC constraints that ensures a seller
with type τi does not report type τi−1, and the other IC constraints
are omitted.
Note that Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi−1,ω))} ≥ Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi,ω))}
since Θ(τi−1,ω) ≥ Θ(τi,ω) by Assumption 1. Thus, from (63) we
have Rτi ≥ Rτj for i > j. The designer’s objective is W = S −
(1 − α)R. Therefore, for a given allocation function q(τ, ω), the
designer wants to minimize Rτi i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. Therefore, at the
optimal solution to the relaxed problem,
Rτi=Rτi−1+
[
Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi−1,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi,ω))}
]
,
Rτ1 = 0.
Therefore, we can write,
Rτi=
i−1∑
j=1
[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj+1,ω))}
]
. (65)
Substituting Rτi , 1≤ i≤M , we get
S − (1− α)
M∑
i=1
piRτi
=
n∑
i=1
pi [V(q(τi))−Eω{C(q(τi); Θ(τi, ω))}]
−(1−α)
M∑
i=1
pi
i−1∑
j=1
[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj+1,ω))}
]
=
M∑
i=1
pi [V(q(τi))−Eω{C(q(τi); Θ(τi, ω))}]−
(1−α)
M−1∑
j=1
(
M∑
i=j+1
pi
)[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj+1,ω))}
]
=
M∑
i=1
pi
(
V(q(τi))−Eω{C(q(τi); Θ(τi, ω))}−
(1−α)
(
M∑
j=i+1
pj
pi
)[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τj+1,ω))}
])
.
By maximizing the above expression with respect to q(τi) and using
the first-order condition, we find that the optimal q(τi) is determined
by the following equation
v(q)=Eω{c(q;Θ(τi,ω))}
+(1−α)
M∑
j=i+1
pi
pj
[
Eω{c(q;Θ(τi,ω))}−Eω{c(q;Θ(τi+1,ω))}
]
. (66)
The above equation has a unique solution since the LHS is decreasing
in q by the concavity of V(q), and the RHS is increasing in q by
Assumption 1. Moreover, note that the RHS is decreasing in i by
Assumption 1, therefore, q(τi) > q(τj) for i > j.
Now, we show that the optimal solution to the relaxed problem
satisfies the omitted constraints. Consider the IC constraint for type
τi reporting τj . We need to show that the the utility of a seller with
technology τi is higher when he reports truthfully than his utility
from misreporting τj . That is,
Rτi − [t(τj)− Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}] =Rτi−Rτj
+[Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τj , ω))}]≥0.
For i > j, we can write,
Rτi−Rτj+[Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj , ω); Θ(τj , ω))}]
=
i−1∑
k=j
[
Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk+1,ω))}
]
+[Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τj , ω))}]
=
i−1∑
k=j
[
Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk+1,ω))}
]
−
i−1∑
k=j
[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τk,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τk+1,ω))}
]
≥ 0,
since q(τk) ≥ q(τj) and C(qˆ; Θ(τk, ω)) − C(qˆ; Θ(τk+1, ω)) is
increasing in qˆ by Assumption 1.
Similarly for i < j, we have,
Rτi−Rτj+[Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj , ω); Θ(τj , ω))}]
=−
j−1∑
k=i
[
Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk+1,ω))}
]
+
[
Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))} − Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τj , ω))}
]
=−
j−1∑
k=i
[
Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τk);Θ(τk+1,ω))}
]
+
i−1∑
k=j
[
Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τk,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj);Θ(τk+1,ω))}
]
≥ 0,
where the last inequality is true since q(τk)≤ q(τj) for k≤ j, and
C(qˆ;Θ(τk,ω))−C(qˆ;Θ(τk+1,ω)) is increasing in qˆ by Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 6: First we note that in the real-time mech-
anism the seller reports τ and ω simultaneously, and his cost only
depends Θ(τ, ω). Therefore, allocation function q(τ, ω) and payment
function t(τ, ω) must only depend on Θ(τ, ω) rather than exact values
of τ and ω. Therefore, the mechanism design problem can be written
only in terms of θ, where the buyer designs {q(θ), t(θ)}, and asks the
seller to report θ instead of (τ, ω). The reformulation of the real-time
mechanism in terms of θ can be written as follows,
max
q(·)
W (67)
subject to
IC : Rθ ≥ t(θˆ)− C(q(θˆ); θ), ∀θ, (68)
IR : Rθ ≥ 0, ∀θ. (69)
Claim 1. The sets of IC constraints (68) and IR constraints (69) are
satisfied if and only if
∂Rθ
∂θ
= −Cθ(q(θ); θ), (70)
Rθ ≥ 0, (71)
and q(θ) is decreasing in θ.
We prove the result of Claim 1 below. Assume (68) is true.
Consider the following two IC constraints, where the first one requires
that a seller with type θ does not gain by misreporting θˆ, and the
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second one requires that a seller with true type θˆ does not gain by
misreporting θ.
t(θˆ)− C(q(θˆ); θˆ) ≥ t(θ)− C(q(θ); θˆ),
t(θ)− C(q(θ); θ) ≥ t(θˆ)− C(q(θˆ); θ).
By subtracting the above two IC constraints, we obtain,
C(q(θˆ); θˆ)−C(q(θˆ); θ)≤Rθ−Rθˆ≤C(q(θ); θˆ)−C(q(θ); θ). (72)
Let θˆ = θ+ and take → 0. Then ∂Rθ
∂θ
= −Cθ(q(θ); θ). Moreover,
by (72),
C(q(θˆ); θˆ)−C(q(θˆ); θ)≤C(q(θ); θˆ)−C(q(θ); θ),
which along with Assumption 1, implies that q(θ)>q(θˆ) for θ<θˆ.
Furthermore, by Assumption 1 ∂Rθ
∂θ
=−Cθ(q(θ);θ)≤0. Therefore,
(69) is satisfied if and only if Rθ≥0.
To prove the converse, assume that (70) and (71) hold and q(θ) is
decreasing in θ. First, we show that the IC constraints (68) is satisfied.
For any θ and θˆ, we have
Rθ−
[
t(θˆ)− C(q(θˆ); θ)
]
=[Rθ −Rθˆ]−
[
C(q(θˆ); θˆ)−C(q(θˆ); θ)
]
=
∫ θˆ
θ
Cθ(q(θ˘); θ˘)dθ˘−
[
C(q(θˆ); θˆ)−C(q(θˆ); θ))
]
≥0,
where the second equality follows from (70) and the last inequality
is true since Cθ(qˆ; θ) is decreasing in θ by Assumption 1, and q(θ)
is decreasing in θ.
Moreover, we have Rθ = Rθ −
∫ θ
θ
Cθ(q(θˆ);θˆ)dθˆ ≥ 0. This
completes the proof of Claim 1.
We note that q(τ, ω) only depends on Θ(τ, ω). Thus, the sets of
constraints given by (70) and (13) are equivalent.
Next, we show that we can replace the set of IR constraints (9)
by Rτ1 = RP (τ1; q). Equation (72) implies that Rθ ≥ Rθˆ for
θ < θˆ, since q(θ) is decreasing in θ. That is, RΘ(τ1,ω) ≤ Rθˆ for
all θˆ. Thus, the set of IR constraints (9) is satisfied if and only if
Rτ1,ω≥0. Therefore, by (70), we can write,
Rτ1 =Eω{RΘ(τ1,ω)}+Rτ1,ω
≥Eω{RΘ(τ1,ω)}
=
∫ ω
ω
∫ ωˆ
ω
Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ); Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)
=
∫ ω
ω
∫ ω
ωˆ
Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ); Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dG(ω)dωˆ
=
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ωˆ)]Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ); Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆ
= RP (τ1; q).
Finally, we show that Rτi − Rτi−1 = RT (τi−1,τi; q) +
RW (τi−1,τi; q). Using (70), we have
Rτi−Rτi−1 =Eωˆ{Rτi−1,ωˆ}−Eωˆ{Rτi−1,ωˆ}
=Eωˆ{RΘ(τi,ωˆ)−RΘ(τi−1,ωˆ)}
=−
∫∫ Θ(τi,ωˆ)
Θ(τi−1,ωˆ)
Cθ(q(θ˘); θ˘)dθ˘dG(ωˆ).
By the change of variable θ˘ = Θ(τi−1, ωˆ), we obtain,∫∫ Θ(τi,ω)
Θ(τi−1,ω)
Cθ(q(θ˘); θ˘)dθ˘dG(ω)
= −
∫∫ σ∗(τi−1;τi,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τi−1, ωˆ); Θ(τi−1, ωˆ))Θω(τi−1, ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)
=
∫∫ ω
σ∗(τˆ ;τ,ω)
Cθ(q(τˆ , ωˆ); Θ(τˆ , ωˆ))Θω(τˆ , ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)
which is the same as the RHS of (56). Thus, from the proof of Lemma
4, we have Rτi −Rτi−1 = RT (τi−1, τi; q) +RW (τi−1, τi; q).
Proof of Lemma 7:
The IC constraint (34) for the dynamic mechanism with monitoring
is given by,
Eω{Rτi,ω}≥Eω{t(τj , ω)−C(q(τj ,ω);Θ(τi,ω))} ∀τ,τj.
We can rewrite the above IC constraint as,
Rτi−Rτj ≥ Eω{t(τj,ω)− C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τi,ω))}−Rτj
=
∫
[C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ω))−C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τi,ω))] dG(ω)
= RT (τj , τi; q) ∀τi,τj.
Therefore, we can replace the set of IC constraints (34) by Rτi −
Rτi ≥ RT (τj , τi; q) for all i, j ∈ [1, ...,M ].
Using an argument similar to that of the proof of Lemma 4, we can
further reduce the set of IC constraints to Rτi−Rτj ≥RT(τj , τi; q)
for only i>j, i, j∈{1, ..,M}.
APPENDIX C - CLOSED FORM SOLUTIONS
In this appendix, we provide closed form solutions for the mech-
anism design problems formulated in Sections IV and VI.
A. The forward mechanism
Using the results of Lemmas 5, the optimal allocation q(τ) is given
by the unique solution to the following equation,
v(q) =Eω{c(q; Θ(τi, ω))}
+ (1−α)
i∑
j=i+1
pj
pi
[
Eω{c(q;Θ(τi,ω))}−Eω{c(q;Θ(τi+1,ω))}
]
;
the optimal payment function t(τi, ω), i∈{1, 2, ...,M} is given by,
t(τi)=Eω{C(q(τi); Θ(τi, ω))}+Rτi
=Eω{C(q(τi); Θ(τi, ω))}
+
i+1∑
j=1
[
Eω{C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj+1,ω))}
]
.
Proof.: The proof follows directly from equations (65,66) (in the
proof of Lemma 5), which determine the optimal allocation function
q(τ) and the seller’s revenue Rτ .
B. The real-time mechanism
Using the result Lemma 6, the optimal allocation q(τ, ω) is given
by the unique solution to the following equation,7
v(q) = c(q; Θ(τ, ω)) + (1− α)F (Θ(τ, ω))
f(Θ(τ, ω))
cθ(q; Θ(τ, ω));
7We assume that c(q; θ)+ (1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
cθ(q; θ) is increasing in q for all θ.
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the optimal payment function t(τ, ω) is given by,
t(τ, ω)=C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))+Rτ,ω
=C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))+
∫ θ
Θ(τ,ω)
Cθ(q(θ); θ)dθ.
Proof.: Using (70) in the proof of Lemma 6, we can write,
Rθ =
∫ θ
θ
Cθ(q(θ); θ)dθ,
by setting Rθ = Rτ1,ω = 0. Let F (θ) :=
∑M
i=1 piFi(θ) and
f(θ) :=
∑M
i=1 pifi(θ). Then, we can write,
W =S − (1− α)R
=
∫
[V(q(θ))−C(q(θ);θ)]dF (θ)−(1−α)
∫∫ θ
θˆ
Cθ(q(θ);θ)dθdF (θˆ)
=
∫
[V(q(θ))−C(q(θ);θ)]dF (θ)−(1−α)
∫∫ θ
θ
Cθ(q(θ);θ)dF (θˆ)dθ
=
∫
[V(q(θ)−C(q(θ);θ)]dF (θ)− (1−α)
∫
Cθ(q(θ);θ)F (θ)dθ
=
∫ [
V(q(θ))− C(q(θ); θ)− (1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
Cθ(q(θ); θ)
]
dF (θ).
Hence, using Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 6, we can rewrite the
optimization problem (67) as follows,
max
q(·)
∫ [
V(q(θ))−C(q(θ);θ)−(1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
Cθ(q(θ);θ)
]
dF (θ) (73)
subject to (74)
q(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Consider a relaxed version of the above optimization problem by ig-
noring the monotonicity constraint on q(θ). The optimal solution q(θ)
to the relaxed problem is determined by maximizing the integrand
in (74) for each θ, and is given by unique solution to the following
equation,
v(q) = c(q; θ) + (1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
cθ(q; θ). (75)
We note that if c(q; θ) + (1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
cθ(q; θ) is increasing in θ, then
the optimal q(θ) determined above is decreasing in θ, and thus,
automatically satisfies the ignored monotonicity condition on q(θ).
C. The dynamic mechanism with monitoring
Using the results of Lemma 7, the optimal allocation q(τ, ω) is
given by the unique solution to the following equation,
v(q) = c(q;Θ(τi,ω))+(1−α)
M∑
j=i+1
pj
pi
[
c(q;Θ(τi,ω))−c(q;Θ(τi+1,ω))
]
;
the optimal payment function t(τi, ω), i∈{1, 2, ...,M} is given by,
t(τi, ω)=C(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))+Rτi,ω
=C(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))
+
i+1∑
j=1
[
C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj,ω))−C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τj+1,ω))
]
.
Proof.: Using the result of Lemma 7, the dynamic mechanism
with monitoring is given by the solution to the following optimization
problem,
max W
subject to
Rτi −Rτi−1 = RT (τi−1, τi; q), i∈{2, ...,M},
Rτ1 ≥ 0.
Note that W = S− (1−α)R. As a result, at the optimal solution
of the relaxed problem we have,
Rτi = Rτi−1 +RT (τi−1, τi; q), i∈{2, ...,M},
Rτ1 = 0.
Substituting Rτi , 1≤i≤M , we obtain,
W=S− (1−α)
n∑
j=1
pjRτj
=S − (1−α)
M∑
j=1
(
pj
j−1∑
i=1
RT (τi, τi+1; q)
)
=S − (1−α)
M−1∑
i=1
(
M∑
j=i+1
pj
)
RT (τi, τi+1; q)
=
M∑
i=1
pi
∫
[V(q(τi, ω))−C(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))]dG(ω)− (1−α)
[
M−1∑
i=1
(
M∑
j=i+1
pj
)∫
[C(q(τi,ω);Θ(τi,ω))−C(q(τi,ω);Θ(τi+1,ω))]dG(ω)
]
=
M∑
i=1
pi
∫ [
V(q(τi, ω))−C(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))− (1−α)
[
M∑
j=i+1
pj
pi
[
C(q(τi,ω);Θ(τi,ω))−C(q(τi,ω);Θ(τi+1,ω))
]]
dG(ω)
]
.
By maximizing the integrand point-wise with respect to q(τi, ω) and
using the first-order condition, we find that the optimal value of
q(τi, ω) is determined by the following equation,
v(q) = c(q;Θ(τi,ω))+(1−α)
M∑
j=i+1
pi
pj
[
c(q;Θ(τi,ω))−c(q;Θ(τi+1,ω))
]
.
The above equation has a unique solution since the LHS is decreasing
in q by the concavity of V(q), and the RHS is increasing in q by
Assumption 1.
D. The dynamic mechanism
For the dynamic mechanism there exists no closed form solution
for arbitrary M and parameters of the model, since the set of binding
constraints from the inequality constraints given by (23) cannot be
determined a priori, and depends on the allocation function q(τ, ω)
(see [3] for more discussion). However, for the case with two possible
technologies, i.e. M = 2, we provide the closed form solutions for
the dynamic mechanism in the following.
If c(qˆ; Θ(τ1, ω))−Θω(τ1,ω) pτ2pτ1
G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))
g(ω)
cθ(qˆ;Θ(τ1,ω)) is
increasing in qˆ, for all ω, the optimal allocation q(τ, ω) is given
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by the unique solution to the following equations,
v(q(τ2,ω))=c(q(τ2, ω); Θ(τ2, ω)) (76)
v(q(τ1,ω))=c(q(τ1, ω); Θ(τ1, ω))−
[
(1−α)pτ2
pτ1
Θω(τ1,ω)
G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))
g(ω)
cθ(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))
]
; (77)
the optimal payment function t(τi, ω), is given by,
t(τ2, ω):=C(q(τ2, ω); Θ(τ2, ω))
−
∫∫ ω
σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω)
Cθ(q(τ1, ω);Θ(τ1, ω))Θω(τ1, ω)dG(ωˆ)dω
−
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ2, ωˆ); Θ(τ2, ωˆ))Θω(τ2, ωˆ)dωˆ
+
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ωˆ)]Cθ(q(τ2, ωˆ);Θ(τ2, ωˆ))Θω(τ2, ωˆ)dωˆ, (78)
t(τ1, ω):=C(q(τ1, ω);Θ(τ1, ω))
−
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ); Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆ
+
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ωˆ)]Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ);Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆ. (79)
Proof.: The designer’s objective is W = S − (1 − α)R.
Therefore, given an allocation function q(τ, ω), the designer wants to
minimize the information rent Rτ such that it satisfies the conditions
of part (c) of Theorem 2. For M = 2, we have Rτ1 = 0 and
Rτ2 =RT (τ1, τ2; q)+RW (τ1, τ2; q). Using the results of Lemma
1 and 4, we can rewrite the dynamic mechanism design problem as,
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
pτ2Sτ2 − (1− α)pτ2Rτ2 + pτ1Sτ1
subject to
Rτ2 =RT (τ1, τ2; q)+RW (τ1, τ2; q),
∂Rτ2,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ2, ω); Θ(τ2, ω))Θω(τ2, ω), (80)
∂Rτ1,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ1, ω); Θ(τ1, ω))Θω(τ1, ω), (81)
q(τ2, ω) and q(τ1, ω) are increasing in ω. (82)
Consider the following relaxation of the above problem, where the
last three constraints are omitted.
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
pτ2Sτ2 − (1− α)pτ2Rτ2 + pτ1Sτ1 (83)
subject to
Rτ2 =RT (τ1, τ2; q)+RW (τ1, τ2; q). (84)
Below, we determine the solution to the above relaxed problem
and show that its optimal solution also solves the original dynamic
mechanism design problems. Using (58) and (84), we obtain,
Rτ2=−
∫∫ σ∗(τ1;τ2,ωˆ)
ωˆ
Cθ(q(τ1, ω); Θ(τ1, ω))Θω(τ1, ω)dωdG(ωˆ)
=−
∫∫ ω
σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω)
Cθ(q(τ1, ω); Θ(τ1, ω))Θω(τ1, ω)dG(ωˆ)dω
=−
∫
[G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))]Cθ(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))Θω(τ1,ω)dω
=−
∫
[G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))]Cθ(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))Θω(τ1,ω)dG(ω)
g(ω)
,
where the second equality results from changing the order of inte-
gration and σ∗(τ1;τ2,σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω)) = ω. Therefore, we can write the
objective function (83) as,
pτ2Sτ2−(1−α)pτ2Rτ2+pτ1Sτ1 =
pτ2
∫
[V(q(τ2,ω))−C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω)]dG(ω)+
(1−α)pτ2
∫
[G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))]Cθ(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))Θω(τ1,ω)dG(ω)
g(ω)
+pτ1
∫
[V(q(τ1,ω))−C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω)]dG(ω)
= pτ2
∫
[V(q(τ2,ω))−C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω)]dG(ω)
+pτ1
∫ [
V(q(τ1,ω))−C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))
+(1−α)pτ2
pτ1
G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))
g(ω)
Cθ(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))Θω(τ1,ω)
]
dG(ω).
By maximizing the integrands point-wise with respect to q(τi, ω)
and using the first order condition, i = 1, 2, we obtain equations
(76) and (77). We note that the allocation function q(τ1, ω), given
by (77), is increasing in ω since by assumption c(q; Θ(τ1, ω))−
Θω(τ1,ω)
pτ2
pτ1
G(ω)−G(σ∗(τ2;τ1,ω))
g(ω)
Cθ(q;Θ(τ1,ω)) is increasing in q. More-
over, the allocation function q(τ2, ω), given by (76), is increasing
in ω by Assumption 1. Therefore, the omitted constraint (82) in the
original optimization problem is satisfied automatically.
Below, we construct payment function t(τi, ω), i = 1, 2, such
that the omitted constraints (80) and (81) are satisfied,Eω{t(τ2,ω)−
C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω))} = RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q), and Eω{t(τ1,ω)−
C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))}=0. Define,
t(τ2, ω):=C(q(τ2, ω); Θ(τ2, ω)) +RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q)
−
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ2, ωˆ); Θ(τ2, ωˆ))Θω(τ2, ωˆ)dωˆ
+
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ωˆ)]Cθ(q(τ2, ωˆ);Θ(τ2, ωˆ))Θω(τ2, ωˆ)dωˆ, (85)
t(τ1, ω):=C(q(τ1, ω); Θ(τ1, ω))
−
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ); Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆ
+
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ωˆ)]Cθ(q(τ1, ωˆ);Θ(τ1, ωˆ))Θω(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆ. (86)
By the above definition, we have
∂Rτi,ω
∂ω
=
Cθ(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))Θω(τi, ω) for i = 1, 2. Thus, the omitted
constraints (80) and (81) are satisfied. Moreover,
Eω{t(τ1,ω)−C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))}=
−
∫∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ2,ωˆ);Θ(τ2,ωˆ))Θω(τ2,ωˆ)dωˆdG(ω)
−
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τ2,ωˆ);Θ(τ2,ωˆ))Θω(τ2,ωˆ)dωˆ
=
−
∫∫ ω
ωˆ
Cθ(q(τ2,ωˆ);Θ(τ2,ωˆ))Θω(τ2,ωˆ)dG(ω)dωˆ
−
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τ2,ωˆ);Θ(τ2,ωˆ))Θω(τ2,ωˆ)dωˆ
=0,
where the second equality results from changing the order of inte-
gration. Similarly,
Eω{t(τ2,ω)−C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω))} = RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q).
Substituting RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q) in (85) using (58), we obtain
(78) and (79).
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E. The dynamic mechanism with no penalty
Similar to the dynamic mechanism, for the dynamic mechanisms
with no penalty there exists no closed form solution for arbitrary
M and parameters of the model, since the set of binding constraints
from the inequality constraints, given by (32), cannot be determined
a priori, and it depends on allocation function q(τ, ω). Moreover,
for the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty, we face additional
difficulties by imposing ex-post individual rationality, which results
in the additional set of constraints (33) on the information rent. As a
result, unlike the dynamic mechanism, we cannot determine a priori
the set of binding constraints from the ones given by (32) and (33)
even for M = 2.
For M = 2, the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty is given by
the solution to the following optimization problem.
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
pτ2
∫
[V(q(τ2,ω))−C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω))]dG(ω)−(1−α)pτ2Rτ2
+ pτ1
∫
[V(q(τ1,ω))−C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))]dG(ω)−(1−α)pτ1Rτ1
(87)
subject to
Rτ2 −Rτ1 ≥ RT (τ2, τ1; q) +RW (τ2, τ1; q) ≥ 0, (88)
Rτ1 = −
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τ1,ωˆ);Θ(τ1,ωˆ))Θω(τ1,ωˆ)dωˆ ≥ 0, (89)
Rτ2 ≥ −
∫ ω
ω
[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τ2,ωˆ);Θ(τ2,ωˆ))Θω(τ2,ωˆ)dωˆ ≥ 0. (90)
The last two constraints result from using the results of part (d) of
Theorem 2 (equation (33)) along with the result of Lemma 1, and
setting Rτi,ω ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2. We note that constraint (89) is
written as an equality (binding) constraint (unlike (90)) since for any
value of Rτ1 that does not bind (89), we can reduce the value of
Rτ1 by  > 0 without violating any other constraints and improve
the objective function (87).
In the following, we determine the solution to the above optimiza-
tion problem for the specific example considered in Section VII. We
have, C(q; θ) = θq, Θ(τ1, ω) = (1 − ω), Θ(τ1, ω) = (1 − ω)2,
V(q) = q − 1
2
q2, and G(ω) = ω for ω ∈ [0, 1].
From (89), we obtain,
Rτ1 =
∫ 1
0
q(τ1, ω)(1− ω)dω. (91)
It can be shown that constraints (90) is binding at the optimal
solution.8 When (90) is binding, we obtain,
Rτ2 =
∫ 1
0
q(τ2, ω)2(1− ω)2dω. (92)
Moreover, from (88), we obtain
Rτ2 −Rτ1 ≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1−(1−ω)2
ω
q(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆdω
=
∫ 1
0
∫ ωˆ
1−√1−ωˆ
q(τ1, ωˆ)dωdωˆ
=
∫ 1
0
[√
1− ωˆ − (1− ωˆ)
]
q(τ1, ωˆ)dωˆ, (93)
where the first equality results from (58), and the second equality
results from changing the order of integration.
Using (91) and (92), we can rewrite (93) as,∫ 1
0
[
q(τ2, ω)2(1− ω)2 − q(τ1, ω)
√
1− ω ] dω ≥ 0. (94)
8To show this, one can solve the optimization problem (87) relaxing the
constraint (90), and show that the optimal solution violates the constraint (90).
Substituting (91) and (92) in (87), we can rewrite the optimization
problem as,
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
pτ2
∫ 1
0
[
V(q(τ2,ω))−(1−ω)2q(τ2,ω)
−(1−α)2(1−ω)2q(τ2,ω)
]
dG(ω)
+ pτ1
∫ 1
0
[
V(q(τ1,ω))−(1−ω)q(τ1,ω)
−(1−α)(1−ω)q(τ1,ω)
]
dG(ω) (95)
subject to∫ 1
0
[
q(τ2, ω)2(1− ω)2 − q(τ1, ω)
√
1− ω ] dω ≥ 0,
where we replaced constraint (88) by (94).
The Lagrangian for the above optimization problem is given by,
pτ2
∫ 1
0
[V(q(τ2,ω))−[(3−2α)(1−ω)2−2λ(1−ω)2] q(τ2,ω)]dG(ω)
+ pτ1
∫ 1
0
[V(q(τ1,ω))−[(2−α)(1−ω)+λ√1− ω ] q(τ1,ω)]dG(ω).
Maximizing the integrands point-wise with respect to q(τi, ω), i =
1, 2, using the first order conditions and setting V(q) = q− 1
2
q2, we
obtain,
q(τ2, ω) = max{1−(3−2α−2λ)(1−ω)2, 0}, (96)
q(τ1, ω) = max{1− (2−α)(1−ω)−λ
√
1− ω, 0}. (97)
The value of λ must be such that,
λ
∫ 1
0
[
q(τ2, ω)2(1− ω)2 − q(τ1, ω)
√
1− ω ] dω = 0. (98)
By numerical evaluation, λ = 0 for α ≥ 0.07 and λ > 0 for
α ≤ 0.07.
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Therefore, for α = 0.5, we have,
q(τ2, ω) = max{1−2(1−ω)2, 0}, (99)
q(τ1, ω) = max{1− 1.5(1−ω), 0}. (100)
Using Lemma 1, the payment functions t(τi, ω) for i = 1, 2, is
given by,
t(τ2,ω)=C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω))+
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ2,ωˆ);Θ(τ2,ω))Θω(τ2,ωˆ)dωˆ,
(101)
t(τ1,ω)=C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))+
∫ ω
ω
Cθ(q(τ1,ωˆ);Θ(τ1,ω))Θω(τ1,ωˆ)dωˆ.
(102)
